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NOTE
Prejudgment Interest and the
Copyright Act of 1976
INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of a lawsuit, plaintiffs often give relatively
scant attention to whether prejudgment interest' is available.2 In a
perfect world, there would be little need to do so, as the fruits of
legal victory would give way to clear and unambiguous remedial
rules. Unfortunately for copyright plaintiffs, the remedial provi-
1. Prejudgment interest is the "interest that may be awarded on [a] claim from the
time it was originally due until the time of the judgment." DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.5, at 164 (1973). It is important to distinguish prejudg-
ment interest from judgment or postjudgment interest which "accrues from the time the
judgment is entered." Id. Under federal law, postjudgment interest is awarded pursuant
to statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988). The circuit courts have universally held that this
statute does not bar awards of prejudgment interest in otherwise silent statutes. See, e.g.,
Poleto v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 826 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir. 1987) (collecting cases
addressing this issue); Wildman v. Burlington N. R.R., 825 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir.
1987) (same); Bricklayers' Pension Trust Fund v. Taiariol, 671 F.2d 988, 989 (6th Cir.
1982) (same). In 1982, Congress attempted to pass an amendment to the postjudgment
interest statute which would have permitted the federal courts to award prejudgment
interest under any federal statute. See infra note 65.
2. See, e.g., Anthony E. Rothschild, Comment, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and
Suggestion, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 192, 194 (1982) ("[O]ne common problem recurs in
prejudgment interest case law: the issue of interest does not arise at all unless the plain-
tiff receives a judgment and, even then, interest usually receives cursory attention at the
end of a case after resolution of the liability issue.") (footnote omitted); Joel A. Williams,
Comment, Prejudgment Interest: An Element of Damages Not to be Overlooked, 8 CUMB.
L. REV. 521, 521 (1977) ("[Prejudgment interest] is often relegated to an insignificant
position and asked for only as an afterthought to an otherwise successful lawsuit." (citing
Richard T. Apel, Comment, Interest as Damages in California, 5 UCLA L. REV. 262
(1958))); Recent Developments, Prejudgment Interest as Damages: New Application of
an Old Theory, 15 STAN. L. REV. 107, 107 (1962) ("The subject of interest as damages
has received rather cursory treatment in judicial decisions because of the natural preoccu-
pation of court and counsel with the larger issue of liability.") (footnote omitted) [herein-
after Stanford Note]. Nonetheless, the significance of prejudgment interest should not be
overlooked. For example, in a leading United States Supreme Court case on the subject,
a plaintiff recovered $8,813,945.50 in actual damages and $11,022,854.97 in prejudgment
interest. See General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 651 (1983).
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sions of the Copyright Act of 1976, 3 from awards of statutory dam-
ages to the calculation of profits and actual damages, are fraught
with imprecision and uncertainty.4 One such area of ambiguity is
whether prejudgment interest is available in awards for actual dam-
ages5 under the 1976 Act.
6
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter Act of 1976 or 1976
Act].
4. See generally Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, Measure of Statutory Damages
to Which Copyright Owner is Entitled Under 17 USCS [sic] § 504(c), 105 A.L.R. FED.
345 (1991); Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, Measure of Damages and Profits to Which
Copyright Owner is Entitled Under 17 USCS [sic] § 504(b), 100 A.L.R. FED. 258 (1990).
For a brief discussion of the 1976 Act's statutory damages provision, see infra note 5.
For the 1976 Act's definitions of actual damages and profits, see infra note 78.
5. Under the 1976 Act, plaintiffs can elect to recover either actual or statutory dam-
ages, but not both. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1988); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.01[B], at 14-7 (1994) (noting that the 1976 Act
does not follow case law under the 1909 Act which allowed recovery of both). See
generally Priscilla Ferch, Note, Statutory Damages Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 15
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 485 (1984) (tracing development of the statutory damages provision and
its general purposes). Statutory damages allow a plaintiff to receive an amount which the
court determines to be fair in lieu of an award of actual damages. Plaintiffs can choose
to recover statutory damages regardless of whether proof exists as to the actual damages
suffered. NIMMER, supra, § 14.04[A], at 14-48. Oftentimes, plaintiffs elect statutory
damages because actual damages are difficult to prove. See, e.g., Cable/Home Communi-
cation Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 850-51 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (citing F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 231-33 (1952) (discussing the
1909 Act)); Fitzgerald Publishing Co. v. Baylor Publishing Co., 670 F. Supp. 1133, 1139-
40 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills Inc., 519 F. Supp.
730, 732-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing Russel v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980)).
This Note does not reach a conclusion as to whether a different rule regarding the
recovery of prejudgment interest should be applicable when plaintiffs elect to recover
statutory damages. Under the 1976 Act, courts have not analyzed this issue in any great
detail. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Nortel Grill, Inc., No. CIV-89-1278E, 1991 WL
172079, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1991) (distinguishing leading cases as involving claims
for actual damages and holding that absent proof of "inadequate compensation" awards
of prejudgment interest are not necessary under the statutory damages provision of the
1976 Act); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Metro Program Network, Inc., No. C89-0013,
1991 WL 348168, at *12 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 8, 1991) (holding prejudgment interest recover-
able under the statutory damages provision of the 1976 Act but relying upon two deci-
sions in which prejudgment interest was added to awards of actual damages); Dumas v.
Dagl, No. 88 CIV. 2293 (LBS), 1990 WL 258343, at *6-*7 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1990)
(Sand, J.) (holding prejudgment interest available under the 1976 Act and allowing plain-
tiff to elect either actual or statutory damages); see also Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 257 F. Supp. 729, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (declining to award prejudgment interest
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under the 1909 Act's statutory damages provision in part because such awards are "more
speculative" than awards of.actual damages).
Various courts have addressed whether prejudgment interest is available under other
Acts in which courts can award statutory damages. These decisions, however, are of
varying degrees of relevance. First, and perhaps most importantly, the purposes served
by such awards vary from Act to Act. Second, as a purely structural matter, under some
of these Acts statutory damages can be awarded in addition to actual damages, unlike
under the 1976 Act.
For example, under an early version of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the
United States Supreme Court held that prevailing plaintiffs could not recover prejudgment
interest. See Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1945). Pursuant to
the version of the FLSA then in effect, prevailing plaintiffs recovered both unpaid wages
and "liquidated" damages. Id. at 699 n.1. The Court reasoned that the provision for
liquidated damages served as compensation for delay and that an additional award of
prejudgment interest was therefore unnecessary. See id. at 715. This case was distin-
guished by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Montelongo v.
Meese, 803 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1986). In Montelongo, the plaintiff brought suit under
the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act ("FLCRA"). The court distinguished Brook-
lyn Savings on the ground that, under the FLCRA, plaintiffs could choose to recover
either actual or liquidated damages, unlike the FLSA where plaintiffs recovered both
liquidated and actual damages. See id. at 1354 & n.22. Nonetheless, the Montelongo
court held that prejudgment interest was not available under the liquidated damages
provision of the FLCRA because such awards are not related to the actual losses suffered.
See id. at 1354. The court also noted that had the plaintiff proven actual damages, an
award of prejudgment interest would have been appropriate. Id.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that prejudgment interest was
not recoverable under the statutory damages provision of the Truth in Lending Act
("TILA"). See Marshall v. Security State Bank (In re Marshall), 970 F.2d 383, 386 (7th
Cir. 1992). Under the TILA, plaintiffs can recover either actual and statutory damages
or statutory damages. See Marshall v. Security State Bank (In re Marshall), 121 B.R.
814, 821 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1990) (citation omitted), aff'd, 132 B.R. 904 (C.D. Ill. 1991),
aff'd, 970 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1992). In Marshall, the plaintiff recovered only statutory
damages. The bankruptcy judge characterized such an award as a penalty and declined
to award prejudgment interest. See id. at 821-22. The district court agreed, Marshall,
132 B.R. at 907-08,and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on these grounds. Marshall, 970
F.2d at 384. The Seventh Circuit added that even if the damages were characterized as
liquidated, rather than a penalty, plaintiff could not recover prejudgment interest. See id.
at 385-86. The court quoted from, and agreed with, the comments of the bankruptcy
judge: "'[W]here you have an arbitrary establishment of damages that has no relationship
to what the actual damages might be ... you should [not] tack on prejudgment interest
." Id  at 386 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Finally, a number of circuit courts have addressed whether prejudgment interest is
recoverable under the liquidated damages provision of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act ("ADEA"). Pursuant to the ADEA, plaintiffs can recover lost wages and, if
defendant has acted willfully, liquidated damages. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
Because prevailing ADEA plaintiffs can only recover liquidated damages if they recover
1995]
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The Act of 1976, like its predecessor, the Copyright Act of
1909,7 does not address the availability of prejudgment interest or
even mention the word "interest." 8 However, the United States
actual damages, these cases may be of limited utility in analyzing cases under the 1976
Act where plaintiffs can recover either actual or statutory damages, but not both. None-
theless, these cases may be of some use insofar as they address the general principles
underlying awards of prejudgment interest and statutory damages. The circuit courts are
split on whether prevailing ADEA plaintiffs can recover prejudgment interest in addition
to recovering lost wages and liquidated damages. Compare Reichman v. Bonsignore,
Brignati & Mazzotta P.C., 818 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1987) (characterizing the ADEA's
liquidated damage provision as a penalty and holding that prejudgment interest therefore
serves a different purpose and is recoverable) and Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1102 (1 lth Cir. 1987) (same) and Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc.,
709 F.2d 544, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1983) (same), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 400 (1985)
with Powers v. Grinnell Corp., 915 F.2d 34, 41-42 (1st Cir. 1990) (characterizing the
ADEA's liquidated damage provision as compensatory in nature and holding that prejudg-
ment interest therefore serves the same function and is not recoverable) and Hamilton v.
Ist Source Bank, 895 F.2d 159, 166 (4th Cir.) (same), aff'd in part and rev'd on other
grounds, 928 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) and Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 831
F.2d 1321, 1335-37 (7th Cir. 1987) (same), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1020
(1988) and Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1479-80 (10th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984).
6. This Note does not address many issues related to the availability of prejudgment
interest under the 1976 Act. For example, this Note does not address, assuming prejudg-
ment interest is granted, the rate at which it should be calculated. See, e.g., Gorenstein
Enters. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 436-37 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.)
(analyzing this issue and recommending the prime rate); Frank v. Relin, 851 F. Supp. 87,
91 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (collecting cases addressing this issue). Nor does this Note suggest
the criteria pursuant to which a court, in its discretion, may award prejudgment interest.
See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (1962) (indicating that whether to award prejudg-
ment interest rests with the discretion of the trial court); Board of Comm'rs of Jackson
County v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352 (1939) (prejudgment interest is not recover-
able according to a "rigid theory of compensation" but rather is given in response to
"considerations of fairness") (citations omitted); infra note 201 (addressing briefly this
issue); see also Ostemeck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 176 (1989) (providing a
non-exclusive list of factors that courts consider in determining whether to award prejudg-
ment interest) (citations omitted).
7. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (superseded 1978) [hereinafter
Act of 1909 or 1909 Act]. Although the 1976 Act supersedes the 1909 Act, the provi-
sions of the 1909 Act still control in cases where the infringement took place before
January 1, 1978. See NIMMER, supra note 5, § 1.01[C], at 1-44.23 (footnotes omitted).
For example, one of the leading cases discussed in this Note was decided in 1989 but
involved the provisions of the 1909 Act. See Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989) (for further discussion of this case see infra
notes 93-111 and accompanying text), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990).
8. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court, in Rodgers v. United States,9 held that statutory
silence on the availability of prejudgment interest does not per se
prohibit such awards.' 0 The Court held that the general purposes
behind a statutory scheme, and the relative equities involved in a
given case, should be examined to determine whether prejudgment
interest is available." Thus, when a statute is silent on the avail-
ability of prejudgment interest, a court must analyze two distinct
issues before concluding whether a particular plaintiff is entitled to
prejudgment interest. First,. whether the general purposes Congress
outlined in passing a given statute are consistent with awards of
prejudgment interest. Second, assuming the answer to the first
question is yes, whether the facts of a particular case warrant such
an award.
12
Courts are split on whether prejudgment interest is available
under the 1976 Act.13  Some courts have held that it should be
available, 14 while others have held that as a rule it should not, 5 and
still others have sidestepped the issue by ruling that on the facts of
a given case it should not be awarded.' 6 Unfortunately, few of the
decisions discussed the issue in any great detail. To make matters
9. 332 U.S. 371 (1947) (for further discussion of this case see infra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text).
10. See id. at 373.
11. See id.
12. See, e.g., Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275,
1288 (5th Cir. 1994) (drawing this distinction) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
933 (1995). This Note only addresses the first step of the analysis, whether the Act of
1976 permits courts to award prejudgment interest on awards of actual damages. For
cases which address the second step of the analysis, see supra note 6.
13. See generally 1 NEIL BOORSTYN, BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT § 13.04, at 13-9 to
13-10 (2d ed. 1994) (collecting and analyzing some of the cases addressed in this Note);
NIMMER, supra note 5, § 14.02[B], at 14-21 to 14-24 (same); Alois Valerian Gross,
Annotation, Interest on Awards of Damages and Profits for Federal Copyright Infringe-
ment, 91 A.L.R. FED. 839 (1989) (same); David Goldberg & Robert J. Bernstein, Damag-
es, Attorneys' Fees and Prejudgment Interest, N.Y.L.J., July 19, 1991, at 3 (same).
14. See infra notes 138-163 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 116-137 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. These decisions, while limiting their
precedential value by restricting their holdings to the facts of a given case, very often
have the practical effect of establishing a presumption against awards of prejudgment
interest. To make matters more confusing, sometimes the decisions contain language
which reflects both a desire to limit their holdings to the facts of a case and to establish
a per se rule. See infra notes 116-131 and accompanying text.
19951
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more confusing, cases decided under the 1909 Act are frequently
used for support in cases which uphold awards of prejudgment
interest under the 1976 Act.' 7
Part I of this Note explores the historical development of pre-
judgment interest as a theory of damages and the leading United
States Supreme Court cases on the subject of prejudgment interest.
Part II, after reviewing the remedial provisions and legislative his-
tories of the 1976 and 1909 Acts, surveys the wide range of appel-
late and district court decisions regarding prejudgment interest
under both Acts. Part III analyzes these conflicting decisions in
light of the legislative history of the 1976 Act, the general princi-
ples underlying awards of prejudgment interest and Supreme Court
precedent. Part III also addresses whether the availability of both
profits and damages under the 1976 Act precludes the need for
awards of prejudgment interest. The Note concludes that the 1976
Act permits courts to award prejudgment interest.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of Prejudgment Interest
In early agrarian economies, interest, in any form, was banned
by the laws of usury.18  As a result, prejudgment interest was
17. See infra notes 142, 149, 153 and accompanying text. This is also true for
decisions that have denied awards of prejudgment interest under the 1976 Act. See infra
notes 124-125, 135, 137 and accompanying text. Further complicating matters, these
decisions occasionally cite the earlier 1909 Act cases without mentioning that they were
decided under a different statutory scheme. Professor Nimmer has criticized the practice
of relying on decisions decided under the 1909 Act for support in determining whether
prejudgment interest is available under the 1976 Act. See NIMMER, supra note 5, §
14.02[B], at 14-23 to 14-24. Some cases, however, distinguish between the two Acts.
See, e.g., In Design v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 569 (2d Cir. 1994); Subafilms,
Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., No. 91-56248, 1993 WL 39269, at *8 (9th Cir.
Feb. 17, 1993), vacated in part on other grounds, 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994); Love v. Kwitny, 772 F. Supp. 1367, 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(Mukasey, J.), aff'd without op., 963 F.2d 1521 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 181
(1992).
18. Definitions of usury have varied over time. In these early times, it referred to
the absolute prohibition on charging interest for the lending of money. Today, with the
rejection of such an absolute prohibition, it has come to refer to laws which ban the
charging of undue interest. See David J. Gerber, Prometheus Born: The High Middle
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viewed as an inappropriate measure of damages.' 9 Over time,
economies shifted from a focus on agriculture to systems in which
merchants and industries played a more significant role. Along
with this shift in economic systems came changes in the ways
people viewed the charging of interest. Overall, "[a] practice
which was oppressive and extortionate when applied to the poor
peasant borrower was helpful and stimulating to trade when applied
to the merchant seeking to finance the sale of his wares abroad."20
This shift in attitudes led to the repeal of usury laws, which in turn
paved the way for laws allowing prevailing plaintiffs to recover
prejudgment interest.21
Ages and the Relationship Between Law and Economic Conduct, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
673, 704 (1991); see also Marshall v. Beeler, 178 P. 245, 246-47 (Kan. 1919) (tracing the
history of usury laws); 8 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 100, 101-02
(1926) (discussing the early English laws against usury).
19. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 51, at
206-08 (1935) (this chapter of McCormick's book was first printed in 9 N.C. L. REv. 237
(1930-1931)). Dean McCormick observed:
In a primitive agricultural society, the borrowers of money are chiefly those
who are weak and necessitous and thus are exposed to the over-reaching of the
shrewd and unscrupulous.... Since the needy were the only borrowers, the
practice of "usury"-receiving any recompense for money lent-was con-
demned outright. Thus Plato and Aristotle in Greece regarded lending on inter-
est as unworthy, and Moses invoked the sanction of religion against the prac-
tice .... The Christian Church zealously espoused this moral concept, and
throughout the medieval period the canon law absolutely forbade the receipt by
Christians of recompense for the lending of money.
Id. § 51, at 207 (footnotes omitted); see also DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 165 (noting
the link between the early prohibition on prejudgment interest and usury laws);
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 18, at 101 ("And it is clear that when trade was in its infancy,
when, therefore, there was little opportunity for profitable investment, the relation of
lender and borrower must be very strictly supervised. For, in such a state of society,
borrowers of money were more often than not either the extravagant or the needy.").
20. MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 51, at 207. For example, even under early Roman
law, "while recompense for the mere lending is 'usury,' yet, if a loan be made gratuitous-
ly but is not repaid promptly according to the agreement, then a recompense may properly
be exacted for the lender's losses actually suffered or gains prevented, by the borrower's
default in complying with his promise." id. (citation omitted); see also HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 18, at 103 (recognizing that with the growth of trade, payments of interest
under certain circumstances became "advantageous"); Gerber, supra note 18, at 704-07
(discussing the changes in the laws against usury in relation to the development of eco-
nomic systems).
21. See MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 51, at 208 (discussing the British Parliament's
1995]
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In this country, where the mercantile influence was stronger
from the start, courts have long recognized the desirability of
awards of prejudgment interest.22 Traditionally, many American
courts have distinguished between liquidated and unliquidated dam-
ages to determine whether such awards were appropriate.23 The
courts allowed awards of prejudgment interest in liquidated damage
cases, and declined to award it in unliquidated cases. Courts
"seemed to feel that it would be unfair to award interest on sums
due from the defendant if he could not ascertain what those sums
were."24 In contrast, when those sums were liquidated, awards of
prejudgment interest were seen as an appropriate means of penaliz-
ing the defendant for not paying what was owed.25
Therewas, however, growing dissatisfaction with the distinction
repeal of its usury laws in 1854) (citation omitted); see also THEODORE SEDGWiCK, A
TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES §§ 283-291, at 553-62 (9th ed. 1920) (discuss-
ing the history of prejudgment interest in the English courts).
22. See MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 51, at 210 (citing Reid v. Rensselaer Glass
Factory, 3 Cow. 393 (N.Y. 1824)). Other commentators have reached a similar conclu-
sion:
In the American courts interest is allowed as damages more liberally than
in England. The leading difference seems to grow out of a different consider-
ation of the nature of money. The American cases look upon the interest as the
necessary incident, the natural growth of the money, and therefore incline to
give it with the principal ....
SEDGWICK, supra note 21, § 292, at 562.
23. See SEDGWICK, supra note 21, § 299, at 569; Rothschild, supra note 2, at 195-99;
Williams, supra note 2, at 521-23. A liquidated demand is an amount that "has been
ascertained or settled by agreement of the parties, or otherwise[] .. .is susceptible of
being made certain in amount by mathematical calculations from factors which are or
ought to be in possession or knowledge of party to be charged." BLACK'S LAW DiCrIo-
NARY 930 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). The most common example is an action to
recover a debt owed pursuant to contract. In contrast, an unliquidated demand exists
"when the amount of the damages cannot be computed except on conflicting evidence,
inferences and interpretations." id. at 1537 (citation omitted). A typical example is an
action for battery or wrongful death. In spite of these delineations, there was often
considerable debate on whether an amount was liquidated. See SEDGWICK, supra note 21,
§ 299, at 569-71; Williams, supra note 2, at 523-25.
24. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 173.
25. See Williams, supra note 2, at 522; Stanford Note, supra note 2, at 107; see also
General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655-56 n.10 (1983) (discussing
reasons for rejecting this rationale under modern prejudgment interest theory).
[Vol. 5:427
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between liquidated and unliquidated damages.26 As a result, many
jurisdictions abandoned it.27  At the same time, the rationale for
awarding prejudgment interest changed. Courts justified awards on
two related theories. The loss theory recognized that "the inherent
income-producing ability of money cannot be separated from the
money itself; hence, denial of interest would be denial of an inexo-
rable economic fact. ' 28 The other rationale, the unjust enrichment
theory, recognized that
[t]o the extent defendant has had the free use of the in-
come-producing ability of plaintiff's money without having
to pay for it, he has been unjustly enriched. To divest de-
fendant of this unjustified benefit is not to penalize him, for
it has been determined by the trial that it was never right-
fully his. 2
9
With the breakdown and rejection of the distinction between
26. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 173 ("It is no more unfair to the defen-
dant to hold him for interest on a sum he could not ascertain in advance than it is to hold
him for the unascertainable sum itself .... ); SEDGWICK, supra note 21, § 300, at 571
("There is no reason why the damages to be paid by the defendant should be mitigated
or reduced by the circumstances that his tort or breach of contract was of such an aggra-
vated or cunningly perfidious character as to make a liquidation of the claim against him
difficult."). For a rather famous and elucidating example of a court rejecting the early
justifications for awards of prejudgment interest see Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v.
Richardson, 295 F.2d 583, 592-95 (2d Cir. 1961) (prejudgment interest recoverable under
the Death on the High Seas Act), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962).
27. See generally C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Interest on Damages for Period Before
Judgment for Injury to, or Detention, Loss, or Destruction of Property, 36 A.L.R.2d 337
(1954). Nonetheless, it is an overstatement to suggest that the distinction is of no impor-
tance under contemporary prejudgment interest theory. See Randall Kennedy, Note,
Interest in Judgments Against the Federal Government: The Need for Full Compensation,
91 YALE L.J. 297, 302 & n.29 (1981).
28. Stanford Note, supra note 2, at 109; see West Va. v. United States, 479 U.S. 305,
310-11 n.2 (1987) (prejudgment interest compensates plaintiffs for "the loss of the use of
money due as damages . thereby achieving full compensation" (citing Rothschild,
supra note 2)).
29. Stanford Note, supra note 2, at 109; see General Motors, 461 U.S. at 655-56 n.10
(denying prejudgment interest may grant a windfall to defendant); Miller v. Robertson,
266 U.S. 243, 257-58 (1924) ("One who has had the use of money owing to another
justly may be required to pay interest from the time the payment should have been
made."); see also Waite v. United States, 282 U.S. 508, 509 (1931) (prejudgment interest
necessary for "entire" compensation).
1995]
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liquidated and unliquidated damages, courts established more liber-
al rules for awarding prejudgment interest. Some courts looked to
whether the claim was "ascertainable. ' 30  A claim is deemed "as-
certainable" when it can be calculated with reference to some rec-
ognized standard.3' A further indication of this liberal trend is the
adoption by many states of statutes or court rules which make
awards of prejudgment interest mandatory under certain circum-
stances.32
In sum, prejudgment interest was not considered an element of
proper recovery during the time that usury laws banned the charg-
ing of interest. With the repeal of usury laws came the recognition
of prejudgment interest as an appropriate remedy. In this country,
courts have long recognized the importance of awards of prejudg-
ment interest. The traditional standard for determining whether
awards of prejudgment interest are appropriate, the distinction be-
tween liquidated and unliquidated damages, has been abandoned by
many jurisdictions. The rejection of this distinction has been fu-
eled by the growing recognition that money has an inherent use
value. Overall, there has been a general trend towards a greater
willingness to award prejudgment interest.33
30. See DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 166-67 (observing that some claims which are
unliquidated are nonetheless ascertainable and that courts treat such claims as liquidated);
MCCORMICK, supra note 19, §§ 54-57a, at 213-29 (analyzing the different rules and
dividing them into the following categories: liquidated, unliquidated but ascertainable,
unliquidated but pecuniary in nature, and injuries to interests of personality [e.g., pain and
suffering, etc.]); SEDGWICK, supra note 21, § 313, at 616-19 (discussing the development
of this rule); Williams, supra note 2, at 521-23 (arguing that the shift to the ascertainable
standard conformed to the liquidated-unliquidated rule because when damages are capable
of being ascertained "the defendant knows how much he owes, and in these circumstances
his failure to pay makes a penalty proper").
31. See Kennedy, supra note 27, at 302; Williams, supra note 2, at 522.
32. See Rothschild, supra note 2, at 209 & nn.97, 98. In contrast, in earlier times
and in many jurisdictions, the jury determined whether to award prejudgment interest.
See MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 51, at 206; SEDGWICK, supra note 21, § 295, at 564.
This modem trend, like others in the prejudgment interest area, has been fueled by the
growing recognition "that money has a 'use value,' and interest, reflecting this 'use' by
the defendant, is a legitimate element in providing the plaintiff with full compensation."
Williams, supra note 2, at 521.
33. See DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 165; Kennedy, supra note 27, at 299 & n.l 1.
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B. Leading Supreme Court Cases
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed
the availability of prejudgment interest under either the 1909 or
1976 Acts, it has discussed prejudgment interest in a wide variety
of other contexts. These decisions in many respects reflect the
historical development of prejudgment interest as a theory of recov-
ery. In addition, they provide the general framework for determin-
ing whether prejudgment interest should be available under the
1976 Act.
As early as 1924, the United States Supreme Court, in Miller
v. Robertson,34 recognized the need for awards of prejudgment
interest in cases involving unliquidated damages. 5 In spite of the
historical prohibition against awards of prejudgment interest on
unliquidated claims,36 the Court upheld such an award and reasoned
that "when necessary in order to arrive at fair compensation, the
court in the exercise of a sound discretion may include interest or
its equivalent as an element of damages. '37 The Court recognized
that "[o]ne who has had the use of money owing to another justly
may be required to pay interest from the time the payment should
34. 266 U.S. 243 (1924). This case involved a suit under the Trading with the
Enemy Act ("TEA"). Plaintiff, Mr. Robertson, was the assignee of Mammoth Copper
Mining Company ("seller") in a contract with Beer, Sondheimer & Co. ("buyer") for the
sale of zinc ore. Plaintiff, as assignee of the contract, brought suit for breach of contract.
Id. at 245. Buyer, however, was owned by citizens of Germany, and pursuant to the
TEA, all of its assets were seized by the United States government. Id. The defendant
in this case was the Alien Property Custodian, the Treasurer of the United States. Under
the terms of the TEA, the property seized by the Treasurer could be used to pay off any
"debt" owed to a person who was not an enemy or ally of an enemy. Id. at 248. Both
the district and circuit courts ruled in favor of plaintiff and defendant appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Court reasoned that the TEA should be "liberally construed" and
held that the breach of contract was a debt within the meaning of the TEA. Id. The
Court also held that: (1) the contract did not fail for lack of consideration, id. at 251-52;
(2) buyer was not excused from performance by seller's alleged failure to comply with
the terms of the contract, id. at 253-54; and (3) this contract was not unenforceable due
to the existence of an earlier agreement between buyer and a parent company of seller.
Id. at 255.
35. Id. at 259.
36. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
37. Miller, 266 U.S. at 258 (citations omitted).
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have been made. 38
This recognition of the equitable nature of awards of prejudg-
ment interest was again recognized by the Court in Waite v. United
States.39 In Waite, the Court allowed the plaintiff, in an action
against the United States,4° to recover "interest" 41 under an Act for
the unlicensed use of a patented invention.42 The Act did not spe-
cifically provide for such an award; rather, it provided for "'recov-
ery of [plaintiffs] reasonable and entire compensation for such
use.' ' 43  The Court focused on the word "entire" and held that
interest was necessary to fully compensate plaintiffs. 44
In 1941, the Court began to recognize that statutory silence on
the availability of prejudgment interest should not result in a per se
bar to its recovery. In a case brought by the United States govern-
ment against the surety of a bond, the Court, in Royal Indemnity
Co. v. United States,45 held that "[iun the absence of an applicable
38. Id. at 257-58.
39. 282 U.S. 508 (1931).
40. This case stands as an exception to a general rule, developed in a long line of
Supreme Court cases not discussed in this Note, against awarding prejudgment interest
to prevailing plaintiffs in suits against the United States. See, e.g., Library of Cong. v.
Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986) (discussing the origins of this rule and applying it to Title
VII); see also Kennedy, supra note 27 (tracing the history of this rule and arguing that
it is no longer viable in light of modem prejudgment interest theory).
41. Unfortunately, the Court did not make clear whether its award of "interest" was
for prejudgment or postjudgment interest. See Waite, 282 U.S. at 509. Nevertheless,
subsequent Supreme Court cases have cited Waite as a case involving prejudgment inter-
est. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655 n.10 (1983).
42. See Waite, 282 U.S. at 508-09 (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 509 (citation omitted).
44. Id.
45. 313 U.S. 289 (1941). The case began when a taxpayer filed a claim for abate-
ment of income tax along with a surety bond in the amount of $38,000. Id. at 292-93.
The taxpayer allegedly owed $29,128 in unpaid taxes. Id. at 292. A tax collector granted
the abatement in part, finding that taxpayer owed $8,223.38 in taxes and $4,169.07 in
interest on this unpaid amount. Id. at 293. Petitioner, holder of the surety bond, paid the
collector the $8,223.38, but not the interest. The collector accepted this payment, returned
the bond to petitioner and stated that all liability on it was terminated. Id. at 292-93. The
district court held that the collector did not have the authority to release the bond and
awarded judgment to the United States for the unpaid interest up to the date of the collec-
tor's decision, $4,169.07, but not for the time subsequent to this. Id. at 293. The district
court reasoned that granting such an award would violate the general rule prohibiting
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federal statute it is for the federal courts to determine, according to
their own criteria, the appropriate measure of damage, expressed in
terms of interest, for non-payment of the amount found to be
due. 46 The Court recognized that since this case involved the
failure to pay a contractually owed debt, it was reasonable to
charge the petitioner with the full amount for the delay because the
petitioner's use of the money had wrongfully deprived the United
States of access to the funds.'
Six years later, in Rodgers v. United States,48 the Court reaf-
firmed the holding in Royal Indemnity.49  In Rodgers, the Court
again recognized that when an Act does not address the availability
of prejudgment interest, an award of it is not per se inappropriate.50
The Court held that where the language of a statute does not pro-
hibit such an award, whether interest can be awarded is to be deter-
mined "by an appraisal of the congressional purpose in imposing
[statutory obligations] and in the light of general principles deemed
relevant by the Court. ' 51  Under the specific statutory scheme be-
awards of interest on interest and that it would be inequitable due'to the collectors release
of the bond and the government's delay in bringing suit. Id. at 295. On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that under New York law the
government was entitled to interest during the period subsequent to the release of the
bond. Id. at 293. Because that decision was in conflict with a decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the Court granted certiorari. Id.
46. Id. at 296 (citations omitted).
47. See id. at 296-97.
48. 332 U.S. 371 (1947). Petitioner in this case produced and sold more cotton than
the Agricultural Adjustment Act permitted and the United States brought suit. After
rendering a judgment against petitioner, the district court awarded the United States
prejudgment interest. Id. at 372. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed, creating a conflict with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. Id. at 372-73.
49. Id. at 373.
50. Id. (citing Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261, 284-88 (1914)).
51. Id. (citing Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941); Board of
Comm'rs of Jackson County v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939)). These principles,
according to the Court, have included:
mhe relative equities between the beneficiaries of the obligation and those
upon whom it has been imposed. And this Court has generally weighed these
relative equities in accordance with the historic judicial principle that one for
whose financial advantage an obligation was assumed or imposed, and who has
suffered actual money damages by another's breach of that obligation, should
be fairly compensated for the loss thereby sustained.
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fore the Court in Rodgers, the Court held that the money owed by
petitioner was equivalent to a criminal penalty and that therefore
the plaintiff was not entitled to prejudgment interest.52
Although not a decision involving a silent statute, the Court in
General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp.53 addressed the principles
underlying discretionary awards of prejudgment interest. The case
arose under the Patent Act of 1946, which explicitly provided for
an award of prejudgment interest.54 In an attempt to provide guide-
lines for determining when such an award should be given,55 the
Court held that under this Act "prejudgment interest should ordi-
narily be awarded. In the typical case an award of prejudgment
interest is necessary to ensure that the patent owner is placed in as
good a position as he would have been in had the infringer entered
into a reasonable royalty agreement. ' ' 56 The Court also emphasized
Id. (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 374 (citing Pierce v. United States, 255 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1921)).
53. 461 U.S. 648 (1983). The suit involved a claim by Devex that General Motors
had infringed Devex's patent for a lubricating process on automobile parts. After a rather
lengthy procedural history, the district court awarded Devex $8,813,945.50 in royalties
and $11,022,854.97 in prejudgment interest. id. at 651. The Court granted certiorari "to
consider the standard applicable to the award of prejudgment interest under [the Patent
Act of 1946]." Id.
54. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award
the claimant damages ... together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.").
55. Before the 1946 amendments to the Patent Act, the Patent Act was silent on
whether courts could award prejudgment interest. See 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1940). Nonethe-
less, the Supreme Court, in Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 459
(1936), held that prevailing plaintiffs could recover prejudgment interest. See infra note
201. Prior to General Motors, the circuit courts were split on the issue of whether the
1946 version of the Act incorporated the Duplate standard and, assuming it did not, the
circumstances under which prejudgment interest should be granted. See General Motors,
461 U.S. at 652 & n.7. The Court ultimately held that the Act did not incorporate the
Duplate standard. Id. at 653.
56. General Motors, 461 U.S. at 655 (footnote omitted). In an important and inter-
esting footnote to this reasoning, the Court commented upon the breakdown in the distinc-
tion between liquidated and unliquidated damages and the shifting rationales offered to
support awards of prejudgment interest:
The traditional view, which treated prejudgment interest as a penalty awarded
on the basis of the defendant's conduct, has long been criticized on the ground
that prejudgment interest represents "delay damages" and should be awarded as
a component of full compensation. A rule denying prejudgment interest not
only undercompensates the patent owner but also may grant a windfall to the
[Vol. 5:427
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
that its holding did not require an award of prejudgment interest in
every case, but rather, within the framework established by the
Court, left the matter to the sound discretion of the trial court.57
The principles discussed in General Motors were applied by the
Court to a silent statutory scheme in West Virginia v. United
States.58  The Court reaffirmed the holding of Royal Indemnity 59
and held that the United States was entitled to recover prejudgment
interest against the state of West Virginia for breach of contract. 6°
The Court reasoned that "[plrejudgment interest is an element of
complete compensation. ' '61 Furthermore, "[p]rejudgment interest
serves to compensate for the loss of use of money due as damages
from the time the claim accrues until judgment is entered, thereby
achieving full compensation for the injury those damages are in-
tended to redress. 62
Shortly after the decision in West Virginia, the Court appeared
to retreat from these broad equitable principles. In Monessen
Southwestern Railway v. Morgan63 the Court declined to allow a
infringer and create an incentive to prolong litigation. There is no reason why
an infringer should stand in a better position than a party who agrees to pay a
royalty and then fails to pay because of financial difficulties.
Id. at 655-56 n.10 (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 656-57. The Court noted that it may, for example, be inappropriate to
grant an-award of prejudgment interest when the plaintiff is responsible for any delays in
the trial. Id.
58. 479 U.S. 305 (1987). The case arose after massive flooding during 1972 caused
the President to declare West Virginia a major disaster area. Id. at 306-07. Pursuant to
this status, the State became eligible for federal assistance under the Disaster Relief Act
of 1970 ("DRA"). Id. at 307. Under the DRA, the State was still responsible for the
costs associated with preparing sites for temporary housing. id. At West Virginia's
request, however, the Army Corps of Engineers prepared such sites and subsequently
charged the State for this service. After the State failed to make any payments, the
United States brought suit. See id. at 307.
59. See id. at 308-09.
60. Id. at 307-08, 312.
61. Id. at 310 (citing General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655-56
& n.10 (1983)),
62. Id. at 310 n.2 (citing Rothschild, supra note 2).
63. 486 U.S. 330 (1988). Plaintiff was injured while working as a brakeman and
conductor for a railroad. Plaintiff brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
("FELA") in Pennsylvania state court. Id. at 332. After the jury found for the plaintiff,
the trial judge, pursuant to state law, awarded the plaintiff prejudgment interest. The
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prevailing plaintiff to recover prejudgment interest under the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act ("FELA").6 The Court began by
observing that Congressional silence under FELA as to the avail-
ability of prejudgment interest was not decisive. 65 Nonetheless, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 332-33. Prior to determining whether
FELA granted prevailing plaintiffs the right to an award of prejudgment interest, a unani-
mous United States Supreme Court held that federal common law, not state statutory law,
controlled the issue of whether prejudgment interest was available. Id. at 335, 342
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 350 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). See infra part III.C for a discussion of Monessen's appli-
cability to the availability of prejudgment interest under the 1976 Act.
64. Monessen, 486 U.S. at 336-39.
65. Id. at 336-37 (citing Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 373 (1947)). In
addition to recognizing this general principle, the Court noted a significant failed attempt
to amend the federal postjudgment interest statute. As part of the Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1982, Congress considered an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988)
which would have authorized the federal courts to award prejudgment interest. In the
Committee Report which accompanied the legislation Congress explicitly stated:
There are presently no generally applicable guidelines concerning the
award of prejudgment interest in Federal courts. Yet such interest may be
essential in order to compensate the plaintiff or to avoid unjust enrichment of
the defendant .... The bill provides that, where a defendant knew of his lia-
bility, interest be awarded for the prejudgment period at a rate that is keyed to
the prime interest rate, where this is necessary to compensate the plaintiff. The
imposition of such interest would be left to the discretion of the district judge
in each case.
S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11,
21-22. This provision was not included in the final version of the Act. See Pub. L. 97-
164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). During the debate immediately preceding passage of the Act, a
floor amendment was passed which eliminated the provision. The Senator responsible for
the amendment explained:
In response to the concerns expressed by OMB [Office of Management and
Budget] and on further examination by [judiciary] committee staff, it seemed
that this matter should be given more thorough attention before enactment into
law.
Thus, the entire prejudgment interest provision has been stricken by this
amendment. It is this Senator's intention that this action be done without preju-
dice on the merits of the issue. It is anticipated that the subcommittee will con-
sider the question in the coming months so as to be able to explore all facets
of the matter prior to any further legislative activity.
127 CONG. REC. 29,865 (1981) (statement of Sen. Grassley). Courts which have recog-
nized this failed amendment have not found it dispositive in determining whether prejudg-
ment interest is available under a silent statutory scheme. See, e.g., Monessen, 486 U.S.
at 339 n.8; Poleto v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 826 F.2d 1270, 1274 n.7 (3d Cir. 1987);
Carver v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 600 F. Supp. 125, 126 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
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Court held that this silence, over the course of some eighty years,
was an indication that Congress did not intend for prevailing FELA
plaintiffs to be able to recover prejudgment interest.66 More specif-
ically, the Court recognized that in 1908, when FELA was first
passed, there was a "well-established" common law tradition of not
granting prejudgment interest in personal injury cases.67 Although
Congress had amended FELA to dispense with other common law
doctrines from that era, it had not done so with the rule against
granting awards of prejudgment interest in personal injury cases.68
Moreover, according to the Court, "with virtual unanimity" lower
courts had held that prejudgment interest was not available under
FELA.6 9 For these reasons the Court concluded that FELA plain-
tiffs cannot recover prejudgment interest.70
Overall, the Court has long recognized the need for awards of
prejudgment interest, even in cases involving unliquidated claims.
In keeping with this liberal view, the Court has also held that a
statute's silence on the availability of prejudgment interest does not
create a per se bar to its recovery. In recent times, the Court has
recognized the modem rationales offered to support awards of pre-
judgment interest and the broad equitable purposes served by such
awards.
66. Monessen, 486 U.S. at 337-38.
67. Id. at 337.
68. Id. at 337-38. The Court noted that Congress amended FELA to prevent employ-
ers from being able to raise contributory negligence as a defense. Id. at 337. The Court
recognized that this amendment was enacted "'to provide liberal recovery for injured
workers[.].' Id. (quoting Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958)).
The Court also noted that Congress had amended FELA in 1910, 1939 and 1948. Id. at
338-39.
69. Id. at 338 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 339. In response to Justice Blackmun's dissent, see id. at 345 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting), the. Court distinguished General Motors and Waite: "In none of those
cases did the plaintiff seek prejudgment interest on a cause of action arising under a
statute that, like the FELA, was enacted at a time when prejudgment interest was general-
ly unavailable on similar causes of action arising under the common law." Id. at 339 n.9.
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II. CIRcurr AND DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS ANALYZING THE
AVAILABILITY OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST UNDER THE 1909
AND 1976 ACTS
Before discussing the conflicting decisions under the 1909 and
1976 Acts, it is helpful to understand the general monetary remedi-
al provisions of the Acts. In addition, while the 1909 Act's legisla-
tive history does not discuss the issue in an illuminating manner,
the 1976 Act's legislative history provides some general statements
regarding the purposes served by the 1976 Act's remedial provi-
sions.
A. 1909 Act Background
The first federal copyright statute was passed in 1790.71 By
1905, this early statute was no longer sufficient to cover the in-
creasingly complex nature of copyrights. President Roosevelt un-
derstood the need for change when he stated, "Our copyright laws
urgently need revision. They are imperfect in definition, confused
and inconsistent in expression ... they are difficult for the courts
to interpret and impossible for the Copyright Office to administer
with satisfaction to the public. 72 Four years later, the Act of 1909
was enacted into law.
Sections 101 and 116 of the 1909 Act form the major remedy
provisions. 73 Section 101 addresses awards of damages and prof-
its. 74 Courts are split on whether section 101 allows prevailing
71. See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). Prior to passage
of the 1909 Act, the Copyright Act of 1790 was amended twice. See Act of July 8, 1870,
ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870); Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831).
72. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1909) [hereinafter 1909 Report].
The Senate's report is a word-for-word adoption of the House Report. See S. REP. No.
1108, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909). For a further, and very detailed, discussion of the
events leading up to the passage of the 1909 Act see Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Fred
Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 647-52 (1943).
73. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 116 (1970).
74. Section 101(b) provides, in relevant part:
[Tihe copyright proprietor [shall be entitled to] such damages as the copyright
proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits
which the infringer shall have made from such infringement, and in proving
profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove sales only, and the defendant shall
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plaintiffs to recover both profits and damages, or only the greater
of the tWO. 75  Section 116 provides for discretionary awards of
attorneys' fees and mandatory awards of CoStS. 76 Neither the stat-
ute nor the legislative history addresses the issue of prejudgment
interest.77
B. 1976 Act Background
Under the 1976 Act, sections 504 and 505 provide the major
provisions for monetary remedies. Section 504, resolving the dis-
pute under the 1909 Act, allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover
both actual damages and profits.78 Section 505 permits discretion-
ary awards of attorneys' fees and costs. 79 No mention is made of
be required to prove every element of cost which he claims ....
17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970).
75. For a discussion of this split see infra note. 10.
76. Section 116 provides:
In all actions, suits, or proceedings under this title, except when brought by or
against the United States or any officer thereof, full costs shall be allowed, and
the court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs.
17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970).
77. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101(b), 116 (1970); 1909 Report, supra note 72, at 15-16.
78. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988). 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) defines actual damages
and profits as follows:
The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him
or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are
attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the
actual damages. In establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is
required to present proof only of the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer
is required to prove his of her deductible expenses and the elements of profit
attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1988). In the patent context, the distinction between awards of actual
damages and profits has been described as follows: "[Wihat the infringer makes is
profits; what the owner of the patent loses by such infringement is damages." Duplate
Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 451 (1936) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
79. Section 505 provides:
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the
recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an
officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also
award a'reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.
17 U.S.C. § 505 (1988). An analysis of whether prejudgment interest is recoverable
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prejudgment interest anywhere in the 1976 Act. Nor does the leg-
islative history of the 1976 Act make any direct reference to inter-
est."0 The legislative history of section 504 states that this section
has two basic aims:
(1) to give the courts specific unambiguous directions con-
cerning monetary awards, thus avoiding the confusion and
uncertainty that have marked the present law on the subject,
and, at the same time, (2) to provide the courts with reason-
able latitude to adjust recovery to the circumstances of the
case, thus avoiding some of the artificial or overly technical
awards resulting from the language of the existing statute.8 1
In addition, the legislative history indicates the different purposes
served by awards of damages and profits. "Damages are awarded
to compensate the copyright owner for losses from the infringe-
ment, and profits are awarded to prevent the infringer from unfairly
benefiting from a wrongful act."82
C. Prejudgment Interest Not Recoverable Under the Copyright
Act of 1909
In Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc.,8 3 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied a prevail-
ing plaintiff an award of prejudgment interest and held that the
1909 Act did not support such awards.8 4 The court did, however,
under the 1976 Act need not address this section because, in addition to obviously not
being a component of attorneys' fees, prejudgment interest "is considered as damages, not
a component of 'costs.' Indeed, the term 'costs' has never been understood to include
any interest component." Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 321 (1986) (citations
omitted).
80. See H.R. REP NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161-63 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5777-79 [hereinafter 1976 Report]; see also 5 ALAN LATMAN &
JAMES F. LIGHTSTONE, THE KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT: A COMPENDI-
UM AND ANALYTICAL INDEX OF MATERIAL LEADING TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
163-225 (1984) (reprinting the twenty drafts of section 504, none of which mentioned
prejudgment interest); id. at 227-44 (same for section 505).
81. 1976 Report, supra note 80, at 5777.
82. Id.
83. 420 F. Supp. 404 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
84. id. at 409.
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allow the plaintiff to recover both damages and profits, 5 in addi-
tion to attorneys' fees and costs.86 The court recognized the ab-
sence of any language in the 1909 Act permitting an award of
prejudgment interest and noted the presence of such language in
the Patent Act. Having recognized this distinction, the court held
that, even in cases of "flagrant" infringement, plaintiffs recovery
of both profits and damages served as a sufficient deterrent and
precluded the need for an award of prejudgment interest.8 7
In an early decision by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Davis v. E.L DuPont de Nemours
& Co.,"8 the court declined to grant a prevailing plaintiff prejudg-
ment interest under the statutory damages provision of the 1909
Act.89 The court recognized the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Rodgers, but reasoned that in the absence of any prece-
dent even addressing the issue, the court was not justified in grant-
ing such an award.90 In addition, the court focused on the "specu-
lative considerations" inherent in statutory damages. 91 Finally, the
court believed that plaintiff had been made whole by its award of
counsel fees.92
D. Prejudgment Interest Recoverable Under the Copyright Act
of 1909
In Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 93 perhaps
the leading and most frequently cited opinion addressing the avail-
ability of prejudgment interest under either of the Copyright Acts,
85. Id. at 405 (citing F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228
(1952); Gelles-Widmar Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 30 (N.D. Ill.
1961), aff'd, 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1963)). But see infra note 110 (discussing the split
in authority regarding the availability of both damages and profits under the 1909 Act).
86. Baldwin Cooke, 420 F. Supp. at 408.
87. Id. at 409.
88. 257 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y, 1966).
89. Id. at 730.
90. Id. at 730 & n.2.
91. Id. at 730 (citation omitted).
92. Id. at 730-31.
93. 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990).
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the court upheld an award of prejudgment interest under the 1909
Act.94 The court began its analysis with the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Rodgers and its holding that silence in a given
statute is not a final indication of the legislature's intent with re-
gard to prejudgment interest.95 In determining whether prejudg-
ment interest should be available, the Frank Music court indicated
that the inquiry should focus on the "relative equities" of the case.96
In this regard, the court further reasoned that "[p]rejudgment inter-
est compensates the injured party for the loss of the use of money
he would otherwise have had."97
The defendants in Frank Music argued that the availability of
prejudgment interest under the Patent Act, by the express terms of
the statute, 98 in contrast to the absence of a similar provision in the
1909 Act, indicated that Congress did not intend to allow courts to
award prejudgment interest under the 1909 Act.99 The court, how-
ever, disagreed. 1°° Prior to the amendments to the Patent Act
which explicitly authorized courts to award prejudgment interest
("1946 Amendments"), the Patent Act was silent regarding the
availability of prejudgment interest. 10 1 Nonetheless, "prejudgment
interest was generally available in patent infringement cases from
the date damages were liquidated, and in exceptional cases from
the date of infringement."'' 0 2 Significantly, according to the court,
94. Id. at 1551.
95. Id. at 1550 (citing Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371 (1947)).
96. Id. (quoting Rodgers, 332 U.S. at 373).
97. Id. (citing General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1983)).
98. Section 35 of the Patent Act provides, in relevant part:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reason-
able royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with
interest and costs as fixed by the court.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988).
99. See Frank Music, 886 F.2d at 1550 (footnote and citation omitted).
100. See id. at 1550-51.
101. The patent laws in effect before the 1946 Amendments provided that "the
complainant shall be entitled to recover, in addition to the profits to be accounted for by
the defendant, the damages[] the complainant has sustained thereby .... " 35 U.S.C. §
70 (1940).
102. Frank Music, 886 F.2d at 1551 (citing Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass
Co., 298 U.S. 448, 459 (1936); Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 160 (1888)).
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the applicable language of the Patent Act prior to the 1946 Amend-
ments was similar to the silent statutory provision of the 1909
Act.'03 With the defendant's argument thus disposed, the court
held that Congressional silence under the 1909 Act was not dispos-
itive and that "U]ust as courts awarded prejudgment interest in
order to provide adequate compensation to patent holders before
the [1946 Amendments], this same remedy should be available to
copyright owners for the same purpose."' 104 The court was equally
explicit that it did not intend this holding to extend necessarily to
the 1976 Act.'0 5
In addressing the secondary issue of under what circumstances
prejudgment interest should be awarded, the court held that pre-
judgment interest should "ordinarily" be awarded under the 1909
Act.' °6 The court reasoned that because the 1909 Act only allows
a plaintiff to recover the greater of defendant's profits or plaintiff's
damages, the 1909 Act may not adequately compensate prevailing
plaintiffs."m In an important footnote to this reasoning, the court
observed that prior to the 1946 Amendments, patent plaintiffs could
recover both profits and damages.'08 After the 1946 Amendments,
Congress explicitly granted prevailing patent plaintiffs the right to
recover prejudgment interest, but also eliminated recovery of prof-
its.' °9 Applying this reasoning to the 1909 Act, the Frank Music
court concluded:
103. Id. at 1551 (footnotes omitted). Compare 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1940) ("Mhe com-
plainant shall be entitled to recover, in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the
defendant, the damages[] the complainant has sustained thereby .... ") with 17 U.S.C.
§ 101(b) (1970) (a prevailing plaintiff can recover "such damages as the copyright propri-
etor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the in-
fringer shall have made from such infringement").
104. Frank Music, 886 F.2d at 1551.(footnote omitted) (citing Fishman v. Estate of
Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 584 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ('he denial of
prejudgment interest systematically undercompensates victims and underdeters putative
offenders.")).
105. Id. at 1551 n.8. The court also stated "that Congress's [sic] continuing silence
on this issue in the 1976 Act [should not necessarily] be interpreted as an express dis-
avowal of prejudgment interest. Ordinarily, Congress' silence is just that-silence." id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
106. Id. at 1552.
107. Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 1552 n.9 (citation omitted).
109. Id. (citation omitted).
1995]
450 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
[T]he provision of generally available prejudgment interest
as a quid pro quo for the unavailability of profits in the
patent context suggests the suitability of making prejudg-
ment interest generally available under the 1909 Act where
the copyright holder is limited to recovering only profits or
damages, but not both."0
The court also indicated that "this analogy should [not] be disposi-
tive in determining whether and when prejudgment interest should
be awarded under the 1976 Copyright Act. . .."1,,
In the only other circuit court to address this issue under the
110. Id. The Frank Music court's conclusion that the 1909 Act does not permit
recovery of both profits and damages is not beyond dispute. See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics,
Inc. v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F.2d 194, 196 & nn.4, 5 (2d Cir. 1964) (collecting cases
on both sides and concluding that both profits and damages can be recovered); Baldwin
Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 404, 405 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (holding that both
profits and damages, but not prejudgment interest, can be awarded) (citing F.W. Wool-
worth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228 (1952)). But see Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1176 (9th Cir. 1977) (Sneed,
J., concurring) (arguing that the Court's decision in F.W. Woolworth does not compel
awards of both damages and profits). The source of this controversy is a contradiction
between the language of the statute and the applicable legislative history. Compare 17
U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970) (a prevailing plaintiff may recover "such damages as the copyright
proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the
infringer shall have made from such infringement") with 1909 House Report, supra note
72, at 15 (stating that this provision was intended to comport with the Patent Act and that
"courts have usually construed [the Patent Act] to mean that the owner of the patent
might have one or the other, whichever was the greater"). Thus, the Frank Music court's
holding that the 1909 Act only permits a court to grant profits or damages, whichever is
greater, is not without debate. Therefore, its reasoning that such a limitation was a quid
pro quo for the general availability of prejudgment interest is likewise open to question.
Nonetheless, as a general matter outside the context of the 1909 Act, the Frank Music
court may have been correct that the absence of recovery for profits is an indication of
the general availability of prejudgment interest. See General Motors Corp. v. Devex
Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1983) (tracing the history of the various patent acts and
suggesting that Congress may have reached this conclusion); supra notes 53-57 and
accompanying text; infra notes 183-202 and accompanying text.
111. Frank Music, 886 F.2d at 1552 n.9. It should be recalled that the 1976 Act
allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover both profits and damages. See 17 U.S.C. §
504(a)(1) (1988). Notably, in Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co,, No.
91-56248, 1993 WL 39269, at *8 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 1993), vacated in part on other
grounds, 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994), the Ninth
Circuit expressly declined to extend the reasoning of Frank Music to the 1976 Act.
[Vol. 5:427
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
1909 Act, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit upheld a decision that included an award of prejudgment inter-
est.11 2 The court did so, however, without any discussion." 3
In short, in Baldwin Cooke the court focused on two factors in
holding that prejudgment interest is not available under the 1909
Act: (1) the availability of prejudgment interest under the current
version of the Patent Act ("the 1946 Act") by the express terms of
the statute; and (2) plaintiffs recovery of profits and damages. In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in Frank Music, held that prevailing
plaintiffs under the 1909 Act can recover only the greater of defen-
dant's profits or damages. In regard to the 1946 Act argument,
explicitly raised by the defendant in Frank Music, the court noted
that prior to the 1946 Act, the Patent Act was silent regarding the
availability of prejudgment interest. Nonetheless, prevailing patent
plaintiffs recovered prejudgment interest, in addition to awards of
both damages and profits. Thus, the Frank Music court reasoned,
the availability of prejudgment interest by the express terms of the
1946 Act does not preclude awards of prejudgment interest under
the 1909 Act.
E. Prejudgment Interest Not Recoverable Under the Copyright
Act of 1976
Courts which decline to award prejudgment interest, while nec-
essarily concluding that a prevailing plaintiff is not entitled to such
an award, do not necessarily conclude that the Act of 1976 abso-
lutely prohibits such awards. That is, a court can avoid the issue
of whether the 1976 Act allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover
prejudgment interest by holding that a particular plaintiff, on the
facts of a particular case, is not entitled to such an award." 4
112. Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 592 F.2d 651, 656 (2d
Cir. 1978). The court outlined in table form the various damage awards the district court
calculated, including an award of prejudgment interest. Id. The court stated that "[t]he
only elements of the district court's award which warrant brief mention are those with
respect to profits and statutory 'in lieu' damages." Id.
113. See id.; see also In Design v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 569 (2d Cir.
1994) (recognizing the court's silent affirmance in Lottie Joplin).
114. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
1995]
452 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
Therefore, there are two categories of cases: (1) those in which
courts have explicitly held that the 1976 Act does not, under any
circumstances, permit courts to grant prevailing plaintiffs prejudg-
ment interest; and (2) those in which courts decline to award pre-
judgment interest in a particular case and avoid the issue of wheth-
er the 1976 Act may permit such awards." 5
115. Since this Note addresses the issue of whether the 1976 Act permits courts to
grant awards of prejudgment interest, this section of the Note only discusses the first
category of cases. Nonetheless, numerous decisions under the 1976 Act fall into the
second category of cases. See, e.g., In Design v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 569
(2d Cir. 1994) ("We need not address the question of whether prejudgment interest is
appropriate in copyright infringement cases generally, because here the district court did
not abuse its discretion in declining to make an award."); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe
Communications Co., No. 91-56248, 1993 WL 39269, at *8 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 1993)
(refusing to grant prejudgment interest under specific facts of case and affirming district
court's statement that "prejudgment interest was [not] unavailable as a matter of law"),
vacated in part on other grounds, 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 512 (1994); United States Payphone Inc. v. Executives Unlimited of Durham Inc., 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2049, 2052 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that it was not
"stat[ing] a universal rule" in declining to award prejudgment interest); Love v. Kwitny,
772 F. Supp. 1367, 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Mukasey, J.) (discussing conflicting decisions
but holding that court need not reach a decision since plaintiff conceded that only in
"special circumstances" should a court award prejudgment interest), aff'd without op., 963
F.2d 1521 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 181 (1992); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Nortel
Grill, Inc., No. CIV-89-1278E, 1991 WL 172079, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1991) ("In
the absence of any showing of inadequate compensation . . ., this Court opines that an
award of prejudgment interest on statutory damages is inappropriate."); Tracy v. Skate
Key Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1248, 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Mukasey, J.) (citing con-
flicting decisions and concluding "even assuming without deciding that prejudgment inter-
est is available in some copyright cases, it would not be available in this case"); Manufac-
turers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 75, 84-85 n.10 (D. Conn. 1989)
(declining to award prejudgment interest because plaintiff did not provide guidance as to
how it should be calculated); Blackman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 792, 802
(D.D.C. 1985) (holding prejudgment interest is not "traditionally included" in a damage
award under the 1976 Act), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 800 F.2d
1160, 1161 n.1, 1162 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding district court's ruling with respect
to the 1976 Act but reversing holdings under the 1909 Act).
Because courts do not always clearly draw this distinction, however, this Note also
analyzes those cases in which the holding is not clear. Recently, the United States Su-
preme Court emphasized the importance of clarifying this type of confusion and uncer-
tainty. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1030 (1994) (in determining wheth-
er prevailing defendants under the 1976 Act are entitled to awards of attorneys' fees, the
Court indicated that "[b]ecause copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching
the general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in
Robert R. Jones Associates v. Nino Homes,116 appears to have held
that prejudgment interest should not be awarded under the 1976
Act."7 The Sixth Circuit recognized the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Rodgers, but held that "the measure of damages
applied in this case [was] clearly sufficient to ... deter unautho-
rized exploitation of someone else's creative expressions.""' 8 Al-
though the court appeared to limit its holding to the facts of the
case, three aspects of the decision indicate that the court established
a rule applicable to all cases under the 1976 Act.
First, the court relied upon Bricklayers' Pension Trust Fund v.
Taiariol,"9 for the proposition that "'[i]n the absence of legislative
direction, the Supreme Court, [in Rodgers v. United States, 332
U.S. 371 (1947)], directed that the decision to grant or deny pre-
judgment interest should hinge on whether to do so would further
the congressional purposes underlying the obligations imposed by
the statute in question."'120 Both Rodgers and Taiariol were deci-
sions regarding whether otherwise silent statutes precluded awards
of prejudgment interest.' 2 ' Therefore, the Nino Homes court's
reliance on these decisions suggests that the court was addressing
the issue of whether the 1976 Act prevents a court from awarding
prejudgment interest.
Second, and perhaps most persuasively, the Nino Homes court
boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible").
116. 858 F:2d 274 (6th Cir. 1988).
117. Id. at 282.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. 671 F.2d 988 (6th Cir. 1982).
120. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d at 282 (quoting Taiariol, 671 F.2d at 989) (alteration in
original).
121. For a discussion of Rodgers, see supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. In
Taiariol, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947 and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, both
silent on the issue of prejudgment interest, permitted courts to award such damages. The
district court in Taiariol concluded that the federal postjudgment interest statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1961 (1988), precluded awards of prejudgment interest in statutes which did not
expressly authorize such awards. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that
the Court's decision in Rodgers required the district court to examine the congressional
purpose behind both acts. See Taiariol, 671 F.2d at 988-89.
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further justified its refusal to award prejudgment interest by reason-
ing that
[t]he Patent Act, unlike the Copyright Act, expressly autho-
rizes the court to-award prejudgment interest. 35 U.S.C. §
284. This distinction in statutes governing similar activities
suggests that Congress believed that giving the court in
copyright infringement cases the discretionary authority to
award costs and attorneys' fees would be sufficient to en-
able the court to enhance the deterrent force of the law in
cases of flagrant misconduct. 122
By articulating its understanding of the purpose behind the remedi-
al provisions of the 1976 Act, the Nino Homes court suggested that
its holding should apply to all cases arising under the 1976 Act.
Specifically, the Nino Homes court indicated that by granting courts
the right to award costs and attorneys' fees, Congress eliminated
the need for prejudgment interest. 123
Finally, Nino Homes relied on Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith
Clark, Inc.124  Although decided under the 1909 Act, Baldwin
Cooke applied the same reasoning as Nino Homes in reaching its
conclusion that the 1909 Act does not permit awards of prejudg-
ment interest. 25 Significantly, Baldwin Cooke has been cited as a
122. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d at 282 n.8.
123. See, e.g., Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545,
1551 n.8 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Nino Homes for the proposition that prejudgment interest
is "unnecessary to deter infringements in light of the availability under the 1976 Act of
an award of profits and damages, as well as costs and attorneys' fees"), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1017 (1990); United States Naval Inst. v. Charter Communications, Inc., 17
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1063, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Leval, J.) (same), aff'd in part on other
grounds and rev'd in part, 936 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1991); see also, e.g., Brooktree Corp.
v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (citing Nino
Homes for the proposition that "prejudgment interest may not be awarded under the
Copyright Act of 1976") (citation omitted), aff'd, 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Tracy
v. Skate Key Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1248, 1249 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Mukasey, J.)
(same). It is also worthy to note that in the six years since Nino Homes was decided, no
court in the Sixth Circuit has awarded, let alone addressed, prejudgment interest under the
1976 Act.
124. 420 F. Supp. 404 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
125. See id. at 409. The court reasoned:
[T]he Copyright Act, unlike the Patent Act (35 U.S.C. § 284), does not autho-
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case in which a court precluded awards of prejudgment interest.1 26
A recent decision in the Southern District of New York, In
Design v. Lauren Knitwear Corp.,127 declined to award a prevailing
plaintiff prejudgment interest for reasons similar to those given by
the Nino Homes court.1 28  The Lauren Knitwear court recognized
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rodgers, but held
that where a plaintiff received net profits and the full amount re-
quested for attorneys' fees and costs, it was not necessary to award
prejudgment interest because the dual purposes of the Act of 1976,
compensation and deterrence, had been satisfied. 129  In strikingly
similar fashion to the decision in Nino Homes, this holding sug-
gests that the Lauren Knitwear court intended to limit its holding
to situations where prevailing plaintiffs received this type of com-
pensation.
On the other hand, the court also reasoned that "[t]he most
recent trend ... has been to deny prejudgment interest because an
award without prejudgment interest will sufficiently compensate the
plaintiff and deter the defendant from future infringement."' 130 This
rize prejudgment interest. Rather the Copyright Act, as we have seen, provides
for an award of costs and a discretionary award of attorneys' fees in addition
to the profits and damages authorized by Section 101(b).
We have concluded that even in a case of flagrant infringement such as
that presented here, the cumulative award of defendant's profits and plaintiff's
damages is sufficiently severe as to deter others from like conduct without the
need for an award of prejudgment interest.
Id.
126. See, e.g., Kleier Advertising, Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 851,
852 (N.D. Okla. 1988) (citing Baldwin Cooke for the proposition that "[t]he majority view
is that prejudgment interest is not recoverable"), rev'd in part and affd in part on other
grounds, 921 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1990); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire
Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 264 (D. Neb. 1982) (citing Baldwin Cooke for the proposi-
tion that "[plrejudgment interest.., is not authorized by the Copyright Act of 1976");
Tracy, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249 (citing Baldwin Cooke for the proposition that
"inasmuch as Congress has failed to provide for such interest in the Copyright Act, it is
not available").
127. 782 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Tenney, J.).
128. Id. at 837.
129. See id.
130. Id. (citing United States Payphone Inc. v. Executives Unlimited of Durham Inc.,
18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2049, 2052 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Robert R. Jones Assocs.
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language suggests a holding of more general applicability. None-
theless, further confusing matters, two of the three cases cited in
support of this proposition specifically limited their holdings to the
factual situations before them.'13
In contrast to these decisions, the court in Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Golden Horse Inn Corp.,132 explicitly held that prejudgment
interest is not recoverable under the 1976 Act.1 33  At the time of
this decision, no reported case had permitted such an award. 34
However, the Broadcast Music court found support for its holding
in a decision which addressed the 1909 Act.135 The court reasoned
that given the lack of any authority to the contrary, the Act of 1976
did not authorize courts to award prejudgment interest.1 36 Similar-
ly, citing the same authority, the United States District Court for
the District of Nebraska, without :any discussion, held that the Act
of 1976 does not permit a prevailing plaintiff to recover prejudg-
ment interest. 13
7
v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 282 (6th Cir. 1988); Tracy, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249-
50). But see BOORSTYN, supra note 13, § 13.04, at 13-9 ('The more recent cases favor
an award of prejudgment interest and the trend appears to be in that direction.").
131. See United States Payphone, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2052 (holding it was not
"stat[ing] a universal rule"); Tracy, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250 ("[E]ven assuming
without deciding that prejudgment interest is available in some copyright cases, it would
not be available in this case.").
132. 709 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Pa. 1989). A different decision in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania reached the opposite conclusion, i.e., that prejudgment interest is avail-
able under the 1976 Act. See Whelan Assocs., Inc v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F.
Supp. 1325, 1327-28 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (for further discussion of this case see infra notes
159-163 and accompanying text), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1031 (1987).
133. Broadcast Music, 709 F. Supp. at 581.
134. See id.
135. See id. (citing with approval Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., 420 F.
Supp. 404 (N.D. I11. 1976) (for further discussion of this case see supra notes 83-87 and
accompanying text)). The Broadcast Music court did not address the fact that Baldwin
Cooke involved a claim under the 1909 Act, not the 1976 Act. See id.
136. Broadcast Music, 709 F. Supp. at 581; see also Love v. Kwitny, 772 F. Supp.
1367, 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Mukasey, J.) (recognizing that in Broadcast Music the court
held that prejudgment interest is not "available under [the] 1976 Copyright Act, Congress
having failed so to provide"), aff'd without op., 963 F.2d 1521 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 181 (1992).
137. Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252,
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F. Prejudgment Interest Recoverable Under the Copyright Act
of 1976
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in
Kleier Advertising, Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 138 reversed a dis-
trict court's denial of an award of prejudgment interest under the
1976 Act. 139 The Tenth Circuit followed decisions of the Tenth,' 4
°
Seventh'4' and Ninth Circuits, 42 and held that although the Act of
264 (D. Neb. 1982) (citing with approval Baldwin Cooke, 420 F. Supp. at 409). This
court also failed to address the fact that Baldwin Cooke involved a claim under the 1909
Act. See id.
138. 921 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1990).
139. Id. at 1040-42.
140. The court relied on United States Indus. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223
(10th Cir. 1988). See Kleier, 921 F.2d. at 1041-42. In Touche Ross, the Tenth Circuit
indicated that "under federal law prejudgment interest is ordinarily awarded, absent some
justification for withholding it." 854 F.2d at 1256.
141. See Kleier, 921 F.2d at 1041-42 (citing with approval Gorenstein Enters. v.
Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.)). In Gorenstein,
the court held that prejudgment interest was available under the Lanham Act even though
the statute made no reference to it. 874 F.2d at 436; see 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1988)
("[S]ubject to the principles of equity... the court may enter judgment, according to the
circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not
exceeding three times such amount."). The court further held, "[t]he time has come..
. to generalize, and to announce a rule that prejudgment interest should be presumptively
available to victims of federal law violations, Without it, compensation of the plaintiff
is incomplete and the defendant has an incentive to delay." Gorenstein, 874 F.2d at 436.
Although the Seventh Circuit has yet to apply this rule to the 1976 Act, it has consistently
followed this holding and upheld awards of prejudgment interest under other silent federal
statutes. See, e.g., Partington v. Broyhill Furniture Indus., 999 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir.
1993) (citing Gorenstein and upholding award of prejudgment interest under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Rivera v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 692,
696 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding award of prejudgment interest under ERISA and citing
Gorenstein). But see Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 397-98 (7th Cir. 1991) (dis-
tinguishing Gorenstein where damages were automatically doubled pursuant to statute and
holding award of prejudgment interest would be punitive).
142. See Kleier, 921 F.2d. at 1041 (citing with approval Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990)).
The Kleier court cited Frank Music without addressing the fact that Frank Music arose
under the 1909 Act and specifically declined to address the 1976 Act. See Frank Music,
886 F.2d at 1552 n.9 (for further discussion of this case see supra notes 93-111 and
accompanying text); see also NIMMER, supra note5, § 14.02[B], at 14-23 (noting that the
citation to Frank Music "misses the mark"). One reason why this citation "misses the
mark" is that under the Frank Music court's interpretation of the 1909 Act, prevailing
plaintiffs can only recover the greater of defendant's profits or plaintiffs damages. See
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1976 does not explicitly provide for prejudgment interest, a court
may grant this relief.143  The court reasoned that it would be
"'anomalous' to hold that a plaintiff would be entitled to recover
profits flowing from infringement but not revenue generated by the
use of the profits."' 44 In addition, according to the court, awards
of prejudgment interest serve important deterrence and compensa-
tion functions. 145 In contrast, the court expressed concern that
denying a prevailing plaintiff prejudgment interest would unjustly
enrich the defendant. 146
A recent decision in the Southern District of New York recog-
nized the absence of controlling precedent in the Second Circuit,
but followed, without discussion, the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit
in Kleier and granted an award of prejudgment interest.1 47 Another
Frank Music, 886 F.2d at 1552. In contrast, by the express terms of the statute, prevail-
ing plaintiffs under the 1976 Act can recover both profits and damages. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(a)(1) (1988).
143. Kleier, 921 F.2d at 1041-42.
144. Id. at 1041 (citing Frank Music, 886 F.2d at -1552).
145. Id. (citing Frank Music, 886 F.2d at 1550, 1552).
146. Id. (citing Frank Music, 886 F.2d at 1552).
147. Bourne Co. v. Walt Disney Co., No. 91 CIV. 0344 (LLS), 1994 WL 263482,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1994) (Stanton, J.) (citing with approval Kleier, 921 F.2d at
1041).
In the Southern District of New York, various judges have reached conflicting results
under the 1976 Act. To aid practitioners in the Southern District, the names of the district
court judges appear after their decisions. See Bourne, 1994 WL 263482 at *3 (Stanton,
J.) (holding prejudgment interest recoverable under the 1976 Act); In Design v. Lauren
Knitwear Corp., 782 F. Supp. 824, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Tenney, J.) (holding plaintiff not
entitled to prejudgment interest under specific facts of case and appearing to hold prejudg-
ment interest not recoverable under the 1976 Act); Love v. Kwitny, 772 F. Supp. 1367,
1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Mukasey, J.) (not reaching a decision on whether prejudgment
interest is available under the 1976 Act because plaintiff conceded that only in "special
circumstances" should a court award prejudgment interest and such was not this case),
aff'd without op., 963 F.2d 1521 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 181 (1992); Dumas v.
Dagl, No. 88 CIV. 2293 (LBS), 1990 WL 258343, at *6-*7 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1990)
(Sand, J.) (holding prejudgment interest available under the 1976 Act and allowing plain-
tiff to elect either actual or statutory damages); Tracy v. Skate Key Inc., 14 U.SP.Q.2d
(BNA) 1248, 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Mukasey, J.) (avoiding issue of whether prejudgment
interest is recoverable under the 1976 Act and holding that plaintiff was not entitled to
it based on facts of the case); RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 864 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (Haight, J.) (granting prevailing plaintiff "interest" under the 1976 Act from the
date the action was filed without discussion or citation to any authority).
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decision in the Southern District of New York, also without any
discussion of the issue, awarded prejudgment interest under the
1976 Act' 4 The court relied on a decision in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, again without dis-
cussion, upheld an award under the 1909 Act which included pre-
judgment interest.149  The court also gave plaintiff the option of
electing either statutory or actual damages and appears to have held
that prejudgment interest would be available under both. 5
In a case which exclusively involved the 1976 Act's statutory
damages provision, the court in Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Metro
Program Network, Inc.151 granted an award of prejudgment inter-
est.' 52 The court noted the lack of precedent in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit and relied upon the deci-
sions of three other circuit courts, including Kleier.1' Although
148. Dumas, 1990 WL 258343 at *6.
149. Id. (citing with approval Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc.,
592 F.2d 651, 656 (2d Cir. 1978)). The Second Circuit has recognized the Lottie Joplin
court's silent affirmance of an award of prejudgment interest and has declined to address
whether the 1976 Act permits plaintiffs to recover prejudgment interest. See In Design
v. K-Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 569 (2d Cir. 1994).
The Dumas court also cited RSO Records, 596 F. Supp. at 864 and Larsen v. A.C.
Carpenter, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 1084, 1125-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd without op., 800 F.2d
1128 (2d Cir. 1986), to support its decision. In RSO Records, a copyright infringement
action, the court, at the end of a fifteen page decision, granted the prevailing plaintiff,
without any discussion, "interest" from the date the action was filed. 596 F. Supp. at 864.
Larsen was an admiralty case in which the court awarded prejudgment interest. 620 F.
Supp. at 1125-26.
150. See Dumas, 1990 WL 258343 at *7.
151. No. C89-0013, 1991 WL 348168 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 8, 1991) (Hansen, J.), aff'd,
962 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1992).
152. Id. at *12. This Note does not address whether a different rule regarding the
availability of prejudgment interest should apply to awards of statutory damages. See
supra note 5.
153. See Paramount, 1991 WL 348168 at *12 (citing with approval Kleier Advertis-
ing, Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 921.F.2d 1036, 1040-42 (10th Cir. 1990); Frank Music
Corp. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1550-52 (9th Cir. 1989) (for further discus-
sion of this case see supra notes 93-111 and accompanying text), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1017 (1990); Gorenstein Enters. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc:, 874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir.
1989) (for further discussion of this case see supra note 141)). The Paramount court
failed to address the fact that Frank Music arose under the 1909 Act and specifically
declined to address the 1976 Act. See Frank Music, 886 F.2d at 1552 n.9.
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this case only addressed the statutory damages provision of the
1976 Act, the court's reliance on these decisions is an indication
that it would reach the same result in a case for actual damages. 154
In fact, a different judge in the same district relied upon the same
three decisions and upheld an award of prejudgment interest under
the actual damages provision of the 1976 Act.'55
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York has also granted a prevailing plaintiff, without any analysis,
prejudgment interest. 56 The case involved the complicated issue
of whether the 1976 Act provides protection to computer pro-
grams. 57 On appeal, the Second Circuit did not address the award
of prejudgment interest because the defendant abandoned its appeal
from this aspect of the district court's decision.15 8
In contrast to these decisions, the court in Whelan Associates,
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 159 engaged in a slightly more
in-depth analysis. The court recognized the silence of the 1976 Act
with respect to the issue of prejudgment interest, but noted that
under the 1876 Patent Act, which was also silent on the issue, the
United States Supreme Court granted awards of prejudgment inter-
154. Two of these decisions, Frank Music and Kleier, involved claims for actual
damages and the Paramount court indicated that it found these decisions "well reasoned."
See Paramount, 1991 WL 348168 at *12.
155. See Kleier Advertising, Inc. v. John Deery Motors, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 311, 314
(N.D. Iowa 1993) (McManus, J.) (citing Frank Music, Gorenstein and the Kleier decision
in the Tenth Circuit).
156. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 572 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
157. See generally Lisa C. Green, Note, Copyright Protection and Computer Pro-
grams: Identifying Creative Expression in a Computer Program's Nonliteral Elements,
3 FORDHAM ENT., MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F. 89 (1992).
158. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992).
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's ruling with regard to a preemption issue.
Id. at 696-97.
159. 609 F. Supp. 1325, 1327-28 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). A different decision in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania reached the opposite conclusion, i.e., that prejudgment interest is not avail-
able under the 1976 Act. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Golden Horse Inn Corp., 790 F.




est.160 The Whelan court articulated the standard under which the
United States Supreme Court upheld awards of prejudgment inter-
est under the 1876 Patent Act16' and held, without citing any copy-
right case law, that "[bly analogy, the same rule would appear to
apply for copyright infringement."' 62 On the specific facts of this
case, however, the court refused to award prejudgment interest. 63
In short, the Sixth Circuit, in Nino Homes, appeared to hold
that prejudgment interest is not available under the 1976 Act. The
Nino Homes court, in agreement with Baldwin Cooke, a 1909 Act
case, found support for its holding in the availability of prejudg-
ment interest, by the express terms of the statute, in the current
version of the Patent Act. Unlike the Baldwin Cooke court, which
focused on the plaintiffs recovery of both profits and damages, the
Nino Homes court focused upon a court's discretionary ability to
award attorneys' fees and costs under the 1976 Act. A recent deci-
sion in the Southern District of New York, focusing on a plaintiff's
recovery of profits, costs and attorneys' fees, appeared to hold that
prejudgment interest is not necessary under the 1976 Act."6 More
explicitly than either of these decisions, district courts in the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania and the District of Nebraska have held
that prejudgment interest is not available under the 1976 Act. 65
In much the same manner as the Nino Homes court cited a
1909 Act case to support its holding that prejudgment interest is
not available under the 1976 Act, the Tenth Circuit, in Kleier, re-
160. See Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1327-28. Although the court failed to clearly state
to which version of the Patent Act it was referring, it is clear that it was the 1876 version
because the 1946 version explicitly gives courts the right to award prejudgment interest.
See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
161. See Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1327-28 (citing General Motors Corp. v. Devex
Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983); Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448
(1936)). The Supreme Court's standard for awarding prejudgment interest under this
version of the Patent Act was known as the Duplate standard. See supra note 55; infra
note 201.
162. Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1328.
163. Id. The court focused on two factors: (1) lack of exceptional circumstances
which would warrant an award of prejudgment interest; and (2) plaintiffs failure to
suggest a method for computing an award of prejudgment interest. See id.
164. See supra notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
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lied upon a 1909 Act case, Frank Music, in reaching its conclusion
that prejudgment interest is available under the 1976 Act. While
not directly addressing the arguments involving the various ver-
sions of the Patent and Copyright Acts, the Kleier court focused on
the broad equitable principles underlying awards of prejudgment
interest. Specifically, the court noted the apparent anomaly which
would result in allowing plaintiffs to recover profits, but not the
interest generated by the use of those profits. A number of district
courts have relied upon Kleier, without significant independent
analysis, in concluding that prejudgment interest is available under
the 1976 Act.166 In a slightly more in-depth analysis, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also
held that prevailing plaintiffs can recover prejudgment interest
under the 1976 Act.1 67 In addition, the court adopted a standard for
determining whether to award prejudgment interest in a particular
case based upon an early version of the Patent Act, where plaintiffs
could recover profits, damages and, although not by the terms of
the statute, prejudgment interest.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICTING DECISIONS
A. Legislative History and Prejudgment Interest Theory
In determining whether an otherwise silent statute permits a
court to grant prejudgment interest, the United States Supreme
Court, in Rodgers v. United States,168 held that courts should exam-
ine "the congressional purpose in imposing [statutory obligations]
and ... general principles deemed relevant by the Court.' ' 169 Al-
166. See supra notes 147, 151-155 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 159-163 and accompanying text.
168. 332 U.S. 371 (1947).
169. Id. at 373 (citing Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941);
Board of Comm'rs of Jackson County v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939)). The
Rodgers test has been applied by the circuit courts to various silent statutory schemes.
See, e.g., United States v. Patty, 992 F.2d 1045, 1050 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Rodgers
and upholding award of prejudgment interest under the Victim Witness Protection Act);
EEOC v. County of Erie, 751 F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding award of prejudg-
ment interest under the Equal Pay Act and applying Rodgers); Bricklayers' Pension Trust
Fund v. Taiariol, 671 F.2d 988, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1982) (applying Rodgers and reversing
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though the wisdom of delving into congressional reports for indica-
tions of legislative intent is frowned upon by some members of the
Supreme Court, 7' Rodgers endorses such an inquiry, inasmuch as
it directs courts to examine "congressional purpose." Legislative
histories are not, however, always unequivocal. Rather, they often
contain statements of general purpose which must be construed, as
Rodgers indicates, in light of the specific purposes served by
awards of prejudgment interest. After all, it would be a rare, but
nevertheless relatively straightforward, case in which Congress
failed, in statutory language, to provide for prejudgment interest,
but clearly stated in the applicable legislative history that it should
be readily available. 17
1
district court's holding that neither the Employee Retirement Income Security Act nor the
Labor Management Relations Act permits awards of prejudgment interest); Hodgson v.
American Can Co., 440 F.2d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 1971) (upholding award of prejudgment
interest under the Fair Labor Standards Act and applying Rodgers).
170. Although commentators have discussed the Court's general disapproval of
legislative history as a source for interpreting statutory language, see, e.g., Hon. Stephen
Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
845, 845-47 (1992), the Court has not gone so far as to eschew any reliance on legislative
history. In fact, the Court distinguishes among different types of legislative history and
has "repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies
in the Committee Reports on the bill, which 'represen[t] the considered and collective
understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legisla-
tion."' Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.) (quoting Zuber v.
Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)). The Court has rejected reliance on particular types of
legislative history which it has deemed untrustworthy. See Weinberger v..Rossi, 456 U.S.
25, 35 (1982) (isolated remarks of a single senator not entitled to any weight); Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979) (remarks of a bill's sponsor are'not controlling
and must be considered with Committee Reports from both Houses); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968) (Committee Reports are "more authoritative" than
statements made during floor debate). This section of the Note, therefore, focuses on the
1976 Act's Committee Report. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1028 (1994)
(examining this Committee Report with respect to awards of attorneys' fees under the
1976 Act).
171. None of the decisions discussed in this Note addressed the legislative history
of the 1976 Act. This complete absence of discussion suggests that courts may be con-
cluding that such an inquiry is not necessary given the lack of direct reference to prejudg-
ment interest in the legislative history. This conclusion, if accurate, stands in contrast to
the manner in which courts have generally used legislative history in a Rodgers analysis.
When neither the statute nor legislative history makes any direct reference to prejudgment
interest, courts examine the general purposes served by, the remedial provisions of a
particular statute, as outlined in the applicable legislative history, in light of the purposes
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The legislative history for section 504 of the 1976 Act contains
three relevant statements of congressional intent. As to the first
two, the report indicates:
The two basic aims of [section 504] are reciprocal and cor-
relative: (1) to give the courts specific unambiguous direc-
tions concerning monetary awards, thus avoiding the confu-
sion and uncertainty that have marked the present law on
the subject, and, at the same time, (2) to provide the courts
with reasonable latitude to adjust recovery to the circum-
stances of the case, thus avoiding some of the artificial or
overly technical awards resulting from the language of the
existing statute.'72
These two aims appear to create a tension in terms of whether
prejudgment interest should be available under the 1976 Act. On
the one hand, Congress sought to give the courts "specific unam-
biguous directions" so as to avoid "the confusion and uncertainty"
associated with damage awards under the 1909 Act. On the other
hand, Congress intended to give the courts "reasonable latitude" to
adjust damage awards to the specific facts of each case. The state-
ment that section 504 was intended to provide "specific unambigu-
ous directions" seems to indicate that awards of prejudgment inter-
served by awards of prejudgment interest. See, e.g., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc.,
889 F.2d 1497, 1505-06 (6th Cir. 1989) (examining the legislative history of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA")
and concluding, without citing Rodgers, that prejudgment interest was compatible with
CERCLA prior to passage of an amendment expressly providing for it), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1057 (1990); Segal v. Gilbert Color Sys., Inc., 746 F.2d 78, 81-83 (1st Cir. 1984)
(after noting that "both the Act [28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1988)] and its legislative history are
barren of any reference to prejudgment interest[,]" the court concluded that prejudgment
interest was recoverable under the Act because such an award "harmonize[d] nicely with
the objectives of the statute"); Marshall v. Security State Bank (In re Marshall), 132 B.R.
904, 907-08 (C.D. I1l. 1991) (examining legislative history of the Truth in Lending Act
("TILA") and concluding, based on this history, that TILA's statutory damages provision
was a penalty and that therefore prejudgment interest was not recoverable), affd, 970
F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1992); In re W.L. Bradley Co., 78 B.R. 92, 93-94 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1987) (holding, after reviewing legislative history, that award of prejudgment interest
under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act was consistent with Congressional in-
tent).
172. 1976 Report, supra note 80, at 5777.
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est are inappropriate, whereas the statement that section 504 grants
the courts "reasonable latitude to adjust recovery" suggests the
opposite.
One might argue that the "specific unambiguous directions"
language suggests that prejudgment interest should not be available
because this statement indicates that Congress intended the remedi-
al provisions in section 504 to be exclusive and since prejudgment
interest is not mentioned in section 504, it should not be available.
This argument, however, is flawed for two reasons.
First, as a purely structural matter, the attorneys' fees and costs
provisions of the 1976 Act are contained in section 505, not 504.173
Therefore, Congress, by this statement, could not have intended to
indicate that the provisions of section 504 are exclusive. Nonethe-
less, it is possible that this statement indicates that as to the reme-
dial provisions contained in section 504, anything not provided for
is excluded. This language, however, was likely not intended to
exclude awards of prejudgment interest. Rather, as Congress stat-
ed, the "specific unambiguous directions" contained in section 504
were intended to avoid "the confusion and uncertainty that have
marked [awards under the 1909 Act]. 174
Given the lack of any significant case law addressing the avail-
ability of prejudgment interest under the 1909 Act at the time the
1976 Act was passed,'75 it is doubtful that Congress was referring
173. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1988).
174. 1976 Report, supra note 80, at 5777.
175. By 1976, only two district court decisions, one of which was decided in 1976,
had addressed whether prejudgment interest was available under the 1909 Act. See
Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 404 (N.D. 111. 1976) (for further
discussion of this case see supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text); Davis v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 257 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (for further discussion of
this case see supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text). A third decision, in 1978, af-
firmed an award, without discussion, which included prejudgment interest. See Lottie
Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 592 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1978) (for further
discussion of this case see supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text). The leading
case on the issue, Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545 (9th
Cir. 1989) (for further discussion of this case see supra notes 93-111 and accompanying
text), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990), was decided well after the 1976 Act was passed.
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to prejudgment interest. 176 In addition, even a cursory examination
of section 504 indicates that Congress was concerned with other
issues which had given rise to "confusion and uncertainty" under
the 1909 Act. Namely, as the rather lengthy provisions of sections
504(b) and (c) indicate, Congress was concerned about establishing
that both profits and damages could be awarded, how those
amounts should be calculated and resolving the complicated issue
of statutory damages. 177 In sum, nothing indicates that Congress
intended to preclude awards of prejudgment interest by stating that
176. Cf. Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1004, 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(citing the "specific unambiguous" language in rejecting a party's suggestion that the
court use a damage formula different from the one provided in section 504).
177. After Congress decided to revise the 1909 Act, the Register of Copyrights
issued a report on the major issues to be addressed in the new law. See HOUSE COMMIT-
TEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPY-
RIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (1961). Addressing
the damages provision, the report concluded by summarizing the major issues: (1) clarifi-
cation of whether damages and profits, or damages or profits, can be awarded; (2) requir-
ing proof of gross revenue rather than sales in computing profits; and (3) redrafting the
statutory damages provision. See id. at 107. In addition to this report, the Senate asked
a number of scholars to prepare articles on specific issues regarding the revision of the
copyright law. Two reports addressing the damages provision of the 1909 Act were
prepared. One report was based upon a survey distributed to copyright attorneys. See
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY 23, THE
OPERATION OF THE DAMAGE PROVISIONS OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW: AN EXPLORATORY
STUDY (Comm. Print 1960) (Ralph S. Brown, Jr.). The survey did not inquire into the
issue of prejudgment interest and, therefore, neither did this study. The other report was
much broader in scope and addressed general problems arising under the 1909 Act. See
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY 22, THE
DAMAGE PROVISIONS OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW (Comm. Print 1960) (William S. Strauss).
Significantly, this report concluded by focusing on the same three broad issues addressed
in the Register's report and did not raise the issue of prejudgment interest. See id. at 31-
32. Finally, two of the leading treatises on the 1976 Act also give some indication of
what issues the revision process addressed. See NIMMER, supra note 5, § 14.01[B], at 14-
6 ("One of the most obscure issues under the 1909 Act was the question of when statuto-
ry damages ... might be properly awarded.") (footnotes omitted); WILLIAM F. PATRY,
LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 283 (6th ed. 1986) (discussing changes made by the
1976 Act in the statutory damages provision and noting the "confusion" over the damages
and/or profits issue under the 1909 Act); see also ARTHUR B. HANSON, CAMBRIDGE RE-
SEARCH INSTITUTE, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION-COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
ISSUES 142-45 (1973) (reviewing major areas of ambiguity under the 1909 Act and their
resolution under the 1976 Act).
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section 504 was intended to provide "specific unambiguous direc-
tions."
The second statement of Congressional intent regarding section
504 is much clearer with respect to its general implications. Con-
gress stated that section 504 was intended "to provide the courts
with reasonable latitude to adjust recovery to the circumstances of
the case, thus avoiding some of the artificial or overly technical
awards resulting from the language of the existing statute.'178 This
language is a clear indication that Congress intended to provide
courts with "reasonable latitude" to equitably enforce the 1976
Act. 179 Holding that the 1976 Act, as a universal rule, precludes
awards of prejudgment interest is not compatible with such an
intention. Therefore, this language is a strong indication that grant-
ing courts the discretion to award prejudgment interest is consistent
with Congressional intent.
Furthermore, in the third relevant statement of Congressional
intent, Congress explained the dual functions awards of damages
and profits serve: "Damages are awarded to compensate the copy-
right owner for losses from the infringement, and profits are award-
ed to prevent the infringer from unfairly benefiting from a wrong-
ful act."'g ° These dual functions are strikingly similar 
to the pur-
poses served by awards of prejudgment interest; namely, compensa-
tion and prevention of unjust enrichment.1 81 Although this state-
178. 1976 Report, supra note 80, at 5777.
179. See Raydiola Music v. Revelation Rob, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 369, 372 (D. Del.
1990) (in holding defendant not entitled to jury trial in case for injunctive relief and
statutory damages, court cites "reasonable latitude" language for proposition that "the
legislative history of section 504(c) seemingly stresses the equitable nature of the statutory
damages remedy"); Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 69, 76
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing this language to support holding allowing plaintiffs' infringement
action to proceed in spite of prior arbitration award to related party); Glazier v. First
Media Corp., 532 F. Supp. 63, 65 (D. Del. 1982) (holding plaintiff not entitled to jury
trial on statutory damages claim, court quotes "reasonable latitude" language and states
that court should "'exercise its discretion in determining what is just"' (quoting Rodgers
v. Breckenridge Hotels Corp., 512 F. Supp. 1326, 1327 (E.D. Mo. 1981))); see also
Dumas v. Dagl, No. 88 CIV. 2293 (LBS), 1990 WL 258343, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 22,
1990) (Sand, J.) (discussing this language in general analysis regarding calculation of
actual damages).
180. 1976 Report, supra note 80, at 5777.
181. See West Va. v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310-11 n.2 (1987) ("Prejudgment
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ment of Congressional intent is not an explicit endorsement of
court awards of prejudgment interest, it is an indication that the
purposes served by such awards are entirely compatible with the
remedial purposes of the 1976 Act.1 2
Overall, the Committee Report's statement that section 504 was
intended to provide courts with "specific unambiguous directions"
refers to areas of confusion under the 1909 Act. Given the dearth
of case law addressing the availability of prejudgment interest at
the time the 1976 Act was passed, and the complete absence of
discussion this issue commanded in the various reports which pro-
vided the framework for amending the 1909 Act, this language
should not be read to preclude awards of prejudgment interest.
Furthermore, granting courts the discretion to award prejudgment
interest is consistent with the legislative intent of giving courts
"reasonable latitude to adjust recovery" and the general purposes
served by awards of actual damages and profits.
interest serves to compensate for the loss of use of money due as damages from the time
the claim accrues until judgment is entered, thereby achieving full compensation for the
injury those damages are intended to redress." (citing Rothschild, supra note 2)); General
Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 656 n.10 (1983) ("A rule denying prejudg-
ment interest not only undercompensates the [prevailing plaintiff] but also may grant a
windfall to the infringer .... "); Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886
F.2d 1545, 1552 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Awarding prejudgment interest on the apportioned
share of defendant's profits is consistent with the purposes underlying the profits remedy
... [,] to prevent the defendant from being unjustly enriched .... "), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1017 (1990); Gorenstein Enters. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th
Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) ("Without [prejudgment interest], compensation of the plaintiff is
incomplete .... "); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 584 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("The denial of prejudgment interest systematically
undercompensates victims and underdeters putative offenders."); supra note 29 and ac-
companying text.
182. See Kleier Advertising, Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 921 F.2d 1036, 1041 (10th
Cir. 1990) ("[I]t would be 'anomalous' to hold that a plaintiff would be entitled to recover
profits flowing from infringement but not revenue generated by the use of the profits."
(quoting Frank Music, 886 F.2d at 1552)). But cf. United States Naval Inst. v. Charter
Communications, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1063, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Leval, J.)
(awarding prejudgment interest on damages portion of an award and finding "no justifica-
tion" for awarding it on profit portion), aff'd in part on other grounds and rev'd in part,
936 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversing award of copyright and profit damages, but up-
holding award of actual damages on contract theory and prejudgment interest on this
amount under state law statutory grounds).
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B. Whether the Availability of Both Profits and Damages Un-
der the 1976 Act Precludes the Need for Awards of Pre-
judgment Interest
Much of the case law in this area has compared the 1976 Act
to the 1909 Act and to two versions of the Patent Act. It is there-
fore important to understand the types of recovery authorized by
these various Acts. Under the Patent Act of 1876 ("the 1876 Act")
Congress allowed prevailing plaintiffs to recover both profits and
damages, 1 3 but was silent on the issue of prejudgment interest.' 84
After the 1946 amendments to this statute ("the 1946 Act"), pre-
vailing plaintiffs have been able to recover, by the express terms
of the statute, prejudgment interest and damages, but not profits. 8 5
Under the 1909 Copyright Act, which is silent on the issue of pre-
judgment interest, 8 6 courts are split on whether the Act permits a
court to grant both profits and damages 8 7 or only the greater of the
two.' The 1976 Act, in contrast, expressly allows courts to grant
both profits and damages, but is also silent on the availability of
prejudgment interest.' 89
The United States Supreme Court in General Motors suggested
that the absence of recovery for profits under the 1946 Act led
Congress to provide for awards of prejudgment interest.' 9' This
reasoning supported the conclusion reached by the court in Frank
Music that under its interpretation of the 1909 Act, a court's ability
183. See General Motors, 461 U.S. at 654 (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964)); Frank Music, 886 F.2d at 1552 n.9 (citing
Aro Mfg., 377 U.S. at 505). But see 1909 House Report, supra note 72, at 15 (stating that
under the 1876 Patent Act "courts have usually [held] that the owner of the patent might
have one or the other, whichever was the greater"). This difference may be traceable to
the fact that the 1909 House Report was issued in 1909 and at that time courts "usually"
so held, but by 1964, the time of the Aro Mfg. decision, the trend had changed and courts
were allowing recovery of both profits and damages.
184. See 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1940).
185. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988); see also General Motors, 461 U.S. at 654-55.
186. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 110.
188. See Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1552 (9th
Cir. 1989) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990).
189. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1988).
190. See General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1983).
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to award only the greater of profits or damages constituted a quid
pro quo for the general availability of prejudgment interest.1 9' The
issue, therefore, is whether recovery of both profits and damages
under the 1976 Act precludes awards of prejudgment interest.
The Frank Music court explicitly stated that it was not express-
ing an opinion on whether its reasoning was "dispositive in deter-
mining whether and when prejudgment interest should be awarded
under the 1976 Copyright Act....",1 92 The Frank Music court did
not, however, eliminate the possibility that its reasoning would be
considered persuasive, in concluding that the 1976 Act precludes
awards of prejudgment interest.93 An inquiry into this issue is
made all the more important in light of the Supreme Court's appar-
ent agreement with Frank Music's quid pro quo argument. 94
Both Frank Music and General Motors made these points in
addressing the issue of what standard the courts should adopt in
determining whether to award prejudgment interest. The 1946 Act
explicitly authorizes courts to award prejudgment interest. 95  In
General Motors, the Court discussed the shift in remedial provi-
sions under the two Patent Acts and held that this shift indicated
that prejudgment interest should "ordinarily be awarded" under the
1946 Act.' 96 Likewise, in Frank Music, the court discussed its quid
pro quo argument only after it held that prejudgment interest was
191. See Frank Music, 886 F.2d at 1552 n.9.
192. Id.
193. Id. This Note does not suggest that Frank Music, or any other case decided
under the 1909 Act, can be appropriately used to support the conclusion that prejudgment
interest is available under the 1976 Act. See NIMMER, supra note 5, § 14.02[B], at 14-23
(arguing that it is inappropriate to rely upon 1909 Act cases to determine whether pre-
judgment interest is available under the 1976 Act) (footnotes omitted); see also Subafilms,
Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., No. 91-56248, 1993 WL 39269, at *8 (9th Cir.
Feb. 17, 1993) (noting that Frank Music did not address whether prejudgment interest
should be available under the 1976 Act and declining to resolve the issue), vacated in part
on other grounds, 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
The discussion of Frank Music in this part of the Note addresses not whether the decision
supports awards of prejudgment interest under the 1976 Act, but whether its reasoning
suggests that prejudgment interest should not be available under the 1976 Act.
194. See General Motors, 461 U.S. at 654-55.
195. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
196. See General Motors, 461 U.S. at 655.
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available under the 1909 Act.' 97 It offered the quid pro quo argu-
ment in holding that prejudgment interest "ordinarily should be
awarded" under the 1909 Act.'9 In sum, therefore, neither decision
held that the availability of both profits and damages precluded the
availability of prejudgment interest under a silent statute. Rather,
both courts discussed this issue in terms of the standard courts
should use in determining whether to award prejudgment interest.
Even assuming that the reasoning these courts applied to the
standards question is applied to the issue of availability, there is
nothing to suggest that the availability of both profits and damages
erects a per se bar to the recovery of prejudgment interest.199 In
fact, as both General Motors and Frank Music recognized, the
general availability of both profits and damages in the 1876 Act
did not result in such a bar.2° Under the 1876 Act, which was
silent on the issue of prejudgment interest, the Supreme Court es-
tablished a standard pursuant to which courts could award profits,
damages and prejudgment interest. 201 Although the 1876 Patent
197. See Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1551-52
(9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990).
198. Id. at 1552. At a different point in the opinion, the court indicated that "pre-
judgment interest [should be] generally available under the 1909 Act . I..." d. at 1552
n.9.
199. But see Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 404, 409 (N.D.
Ill. 1976) (holding that availability of both profits and damages under the 1909 Act
precludes the need for awards of prejudgment interest).
200. See General Motors, 461 U.S. at 651-52; Frank Music, 886 F.2d at 1551.
201. See Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 160 (1888) (holding that patent damages
are unliquidated, and absent special circumstances, an award did "not bear interest until
after their amount has been judicially ascertained"). In Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety
Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 459 (1936), the Court reaffirmed this standard. In 1983, the
Court summarized what had come to be known as the Duplate standard: "[P]rejudgment
interest was generally awarded from the date on which damages were liquidated, and
could be awarded from the date of infringement in the absence of liquidation only in
,exceptional circumstances,' such as bad faith on the part of the infringer." General
Motors, 461 U.S. at 651-52 (citation omitted). The Court indicated that a plaintiff's
damages were liquidated "if they were relatively certain and ascertainable by reference
to established market values." Id. at 652 n.5 (citations omitted).
These cases did not specifically address the argument that the availability of both
profits and damages precluded the need for awards of prejudgment interest. This suggests
that the availability of both under the 1876 Act was simply not relevant to issue of pre-
judgment interest. Rather, as the Duplate standard itself indicates, the Court appears to
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Act and the 1976 Copyright Act are two distinct Acts, the avail-
ability of prejudgment interest under the 1876 Act strongly sug-
gests that the availability of both profits and damages under the
1976 Act does not preclude awards of prejudgment interest.2°2
Of course, an award of both profits and damages in a particular
case may suggest that an additional award of prejudgment interest
is cumulative and unnecessary.2 3 However, since it is not the case
have been more concerned with the classic distinction between liquidated and unliquidated
damages. Therefore, before adopting the Duplate standard under the 1976 Act, its some-
what restrictive nature should perhaps be reevaluated under modem prejudgment interest
theory. See Wickham Contracting Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
955 F.2d 831, 836 (2d Cir.) (noting that "old common-law rule of liquidated damages no
longer retains its full vitality" and that the modem rationale behind awards of prejudg-
ment interest "necessarily rejects much of the common law's approach to prejudgment
interest") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 394 (1992); supra notes 26-33 and
accompanying text. In more recent times, "courts have moved steadily toward more
liberal grants of interest, and have increasingly departed from standards based upon
liquidation of claims .... DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 174; see Gorenstein Enters.
v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) ("The time has
come ...to generalize, and to announce a rule that prejudgment interest should be
presumptively available to victims of federal law violations.").
202. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 &
n.19 (1984) (recognizing the "historic kinship" between patent and copyright law and
affirming the appropriateness of looking to patent law to help resolve novel problems in
copyright law provided "caution" is used); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab.,
Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1325, 1327-28 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding, without significant discussion,
that "[b]y analogy, the [Duplate] rule would appear to apply for copyright infringe-
ment[,]" but declining to award prejudgment interest under specific facts of case), aff'd,
797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); see also Kleier Adver-
tising, Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 921 F.2d 1036, 1041 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding
prejudgment interest available under the 1976 Act and noting Frank Music's observation
that prejudgment interest was available under patent law prior to adoption of the amend-
ment expressly providing it).
203. See, e.g., United States Payphone Inc. v. Executives Unlimited of Durham Inc.,
18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2049, 2052 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (indicating that it was not
"stat[ing] a universal rule" regarding availability of prejudgment interest under the 1976
Act and holding that where plaintiff received actual damages and profits award of pre-
judgment interest would serve "no purpose") (footnote omitted); In Design v. Lauren
Knitwear Corp., 782 F. Supp. 824, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Tenney, J.) (not clearly resolving
the issue of availability of prejudgment interest under the 1976 Act but holding that award
of prejudgment interest was not necessary to fulfill the goals of the 1976 Act where
plaintiff recovered net profits, attorneys' fees and costs); Tracy v. Skate Key Inc., 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1248, 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Mukasey, J.) (not reaching a conclusion
about whether prejudgment interest is available under the 1976 Act but holding that where
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that every prevailing plaintiff recovers both profits and damages,
the availability of both should not give rise to a per se rule prohib-
iting awards of prejudgment interest. Indeed, granting courts the
discretion to adjustrecovery to the particular circumstances of a
case is consistent with Congress' express intent.2"
In Robert R. Jones Associates v. Nino Homes, °5 the court of-
fered a slightly different version of this argument in holding that
awards of prejudgment interest are not necessary under the 1976
Act. It reasoned that the discretionary ability to award both attor-
neys' fees and costs sufficiently serves the 1976 Act's deterrence
function. 2°6 This argument, however, completely ignores the com-
pensation function of the 1976 Act.207 In order to adequately com-
pensate a plaintiff, prejudgment interest may be necessary. 20 8  In
fact, the Supreme Court has long recognized the compensation
plaintiff recovered actual damages and profits, and it appeared that the jury considered
the amount recovered "appropriate" compensation, additional award of prejudgment
interest was unnecessary to serve the goals of the 1976 Act); see also Wickham Contract-
ing, 955 F.2d at 834 ("Awards of prejudgment interest must not result in over-compensa-
tion of the plaintiff."). Overall, as the Supreme Court has indicated, "interest is not
recovered according to a rigid theory of compensation for money withheld, but is given
in response to considerations of fairness. It is denied when its exaction would be inequi-
table." Board of Comm'rs of Jackson County v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352 (1939)
(citations omitted); see Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (1962) (quoting Board of
Comm'rs and indicating that the decision to award prejudgment interest rests with the dis-
cretion of the trial court).
204. See supra notes 178-179 and accompanying text.
205. 858 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1988) (for further discussion of this case see supra notes
116-126 and accompanying text).
206. See id. at 282 n.8.
207. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1029 (1994) (rejecting one argu-
ment in favor of dual approach to awards of attorneys' fees under the 1976 Act "because
it expresse[d] a one-sided view of the purposes of the Copyright Act. While it is true that
one of the goals of the Copyright Act is to discourage infringement, it is by no means the
only goal of that Act."); United States Payphone, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2052 ("Gener-
ally stated, the purpose-of §504(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976 is to compensate the
copyright owner and to discourage the infringer by disgorging his profits.") (citations
omitted); Lauren Knitwear, 782 F. Supp. at 837 ("Generally, the purposes of the Copy-
right Act are to compensate the plaintiff and deter the defendant from future infringe-
ment." (citing NIMMER, supra note 5, § 14.01[A], at 14-4 to 14-5)); supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
208. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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function served by awards of prejudgment interest.20 9 In addition,
the Court has also recognized that prejudgment interest serves to
compensate plaintiffs for undue delay.210 The Nino Homes court
ignored this compensatory function of awards of prejudgment inter-
est as well.
Even assuming that the Nino Homes court's omission of the
compensation factor was unintentional, the court's holding would
still be flawed. That is, assume the Nino Homes court held that the
discretionary ability to award attorneys' fees and costs adequately
serves the deterrence and compensatory functions of the 1976 Act
and thereby renders awards of prejudgment interest unnecessary.
The flaw in this reasoning stems from a refusal to distinguish the
different functions served by awards of attorneys' fees, costs and
prejudgment interest. As previously discussed, the modem ratio-
nale behind awards of prejudgment interest is based upon the rec-
ognition that money has a use value, and that a plaintiff's loss of
this value is an element of damages to which the plaintiff is right-
fully entitled.21' In contrast, awards of attorneys' fees and costs are
"not based upon losses caused by actionable conduct, only those
caused by the litigation itself .... Thus, prejudgment interest
compensates for the loss of the use of money which rightfully
belonged to the plaintiff, whereas attorneys' fees and costs allow
plaintiffs to recover their litigation expenses.213 To argue that the
209. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
210. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 281 n.3 (1989) (noting that prejudgment
interest serves as "compensation for delay" (citing Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S.
310, 321 (1986))); General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 656 n.10 (1983)
("A rule denying prejudgment interest... create[s] an incentive to prolong litigation.");
see also Gorenstein Enters. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Posner, J.) ("Without [prejudgment interest] .... the defendant has an incentive to de-
lay.").
211. See supra notes 28-29, 56, 61-62 and accompanying text.
212. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.8, at 191.
213. See Osterneck v. Ernst.& Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 175 (1989) ("[U]nlike attor-
ney's fees, which at common law were regarded as an element of costs and therefore not
part of the merits judgment, prejudgment interest traditionally has been considered part
of the compensation due plaintiff.") (citation omitted); Library of Cong., 478 U.S. at 321
(prejudgment interest "is considered as damages, not a component of 'costs.' Indeed, the
term 'costs' has never been understood to include any interest component") (citations
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discretionary ability to award attorneys' fees and costs compels a
per se prohibition on the availability of prejudgment interest ig-
nores this crucial distinction.
In short, the availability of damages, profits and prejudgment
interest under the 1876 Act suggests that it is not inappropriate to
award prejudgment interest under the 1976 Act. Furthermore, since
every prevailing copyright plaintiff does not recover both profits
and damages, courts should have the discretionary ability to award
prejudgment interest. The decision in Nino Homes rejecting the
availability of prejudgment interest is flawed for two reasons: (1)
it ignored the compensation function of the 1976 Act; and (2) it
failed to distinguish between the different purposes served by
awards of costs, attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest.
C. The Impact of the United States Supreme Court's Decision
in Monessen on the Availability of Prejudgment Interest
Under the 1976 Act
Although the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Rodgers permits courts to grant prevailing plaintiffs prejudgment
interest under silent statutory schemes, the Court has denied such
awards under some silent statutes. Prior to the Court's recent deci-
sion in Monessen Southwestern Railway v. Morgan ,214 the Court
seemed to limit such denials to fairly specific categories.2 5  In
Monessen, the Court suggested a broader basis for denying prevail-
ing plaintiffs the right to recover prejudgment in'terest. 2 6 It is
omitted).
214. 486 U.S. 330 (1988).
215. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 374 (1947) (prejudgment
interest not recoverable where plaintiffs damages were in the nature of a criminal penal-
ty); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1945) (prejudgment interest
not recoverable where statute provided for automatic award of liquidated damages).
216. Two recent circuit court opinions addressed the potentially broader application
of Monessen. See Wickham Contracting Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 955 F.2d 831, 837-38 (2d Cir.) (distinguishing Monessen and holding that it
does not preclude awards of prejudgment interest under the Labor Management Relations
Act), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 394 (1992); Randolph v. Laeisz, 896 F.2d 964, 968-69 (5th
Cir. 1990) (distinguishing Monessen and rejecting defendant's argument that it precludes
awards of prejudgment interest under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
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therefore necessary to determine whether this broader basis sug-
gests that prejudgment interest should not be available under the
1976 Act.
In Monessen, the Court held that under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act ("FELA"), which is silent regarding the availability
of prejudgment interest, prevailing plaintiffs could not recover
prejudgment interest.217  Specifically, the Court focused on two
factors in reaching its holding: (1) the nature of the underlying
claim and the prohibition of awards of prejudgment interest on
such claims at the time FELA was passed; and (2) Congress' fail-
ure to amend FELA in the face of long-standing judicial refusal to
award prejudgment interest.2I8  These factors, when analyzed in
light of the Act of 1976, do not preclude courts from awarding
prejudgment interest.
As to the first factor, in Monessen the underlying claim was for
personal injury.219 According to the Court, the common law at the
time FELA was passed did not permit plaintiffs in personal injury
cases to recover prejudgment interest.220 Furthermore, while Con-
gress had amended FELA to expressly dispense with other common
law doctrine, it had not done so with prejudgment interest.22'
Copyright claims under the 1976 Act are unliquidated and, in sharp
contrast to claims for personal injury, since the turn of this century,
courts, including the Supreme Court, have awarded prejudgment
interest on unliquidated claims.222 In addition, while Congress
Act).
217. Monessen, 486 U.S. at 336-39.
218. See id. at 337-39.
219. Id. at 332.
220. Id. at 337 (citations omitted).
221. Id. at 337-38. In order to provide injured workers with "liberal recovery,"
Congress amended FELA to eliminate the defense of contributory negligence. Id. at 337
(citation omitted).
222. See supra notes 39-44, 201 and accompanying text; see also Wickham Contract-
ing Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 955 F.2d 831, 837-38 (2d Cir.)
(distinguishing Monessen on the grounds that common law rule barring recovery of
prejudgment interest on unliquidated claims had "eroded severely" by the time the Labor
Management Relations Act was passed in 1947), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 394 (1992); cf.
Randolph v. Laeisz, 896 F.2d 964, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing Monessen in a
maritime action because prejudgment interest is generally available in such actions). In
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amended FELA to expressly dispense with other common law doc-
trines, Congress has only amended section 504 of the 1976 Act
once to change the monetary limits on certain types of awards.223
Therefore, neither the nature of copyright claims nor Congress' sole
amendment to the damages provision suggests that the holding in
Monessen precludes awards of prejudgment interest under the 1976
Act.
Regarding the second factor, the Court first recognized that
"Congress' failure to disturb a consistent judicial interpretation of
a statute may provide some indication that 'Congress at least acqui-
esces in, and apparently affirms, that [interpretation]. '"'224 Under
FELA, courts had, "with virtual unanimity over more than seven
decades[,]" held that prejudgment interest was not recoverable.225
In the face of Congressional inaction under such circumstances, the
Court refused to allow prevailing plaintiffs to recover prejudgment
226interest. 6 In contrast, under the 1976 Act, courts have neither
addressed the issue for seven decades nor reached a virtually unani-
mous resolution of the issue.227 In fact, only a handful of courts
have comprehensively analyzed the issue, and these decisions only
began to appear approximately six years ago.228 Therefore, unlike
addition, in Monessen, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority had departed from the
Court's "normal inquiry into the relation between an allowance of interest and Congress'
purpose in creating an obligation .... "486 U.S. at 348 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Significantly, the majority responded by arguing that cases such as Waite and General
Motors were distinguishable because "[i]n none of those cases did the plaintiff seek
prejudgment interest on a cause of action arising under a statute that, like the FELA, was
enacted at a time when prejudgment interest was generally unavailable on similar causes
of action arising under the common law." id. at 339 n.9.
223. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, §
10(b)(l)&(2), 102 Stat. 2853, 2860 (1988) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)
(1988)). These amendments raised the minimum and maximum awards under the 1976
Act's statutory damages provision.
224. Monessen, 486 U.S. at 338 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 703 (1979) (alteration in original)).
.225. Id. (citations omitted).
226. Id. at 339.
227. See supra notes 116-163 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Kleier Advertising, Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 921 F.2d 1036 (10th
Cir. 1990); Robert R. Jones Assocs. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1988); see
also, e.g., Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir.
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Congressional inaction with respect to FELA, Congress' silence
with respect to the 1976 Act does not indicate an intent to preclude
awards of prejudgment interest.229
Overall, neither of the factors deemed relevant by the Court in
Monessen prevent a court from awarding prejudgment interest un-
der the Act of 1976. The Act of 1976, unlike FELA, has not been
the subject of extended judicial interpretation regarding the avail-
ability of prejudgment interest, nor has it been amended in the
same manner, or as frequently, as FELA. In addition, copyright
claims are unliquidated and in contrast to claims for personal inju-
ry, courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have long
upheld awards of prejudgment interest on such claims.
CONCLUSION
Congress' silence with respect to the availability of prejudg-
ment interest under the 1976 Act does not require a per se rule
prohibiting its recovery. An examination of the applicable legisla-
tive history and the general purposes underlying awards of prejudg-
ment interest supports the conclusion that it should be available
under the 1976 Act. Neither the availability of both profits and
damages under the 1976 Act, nor a recent Supreme Court decision
refusing to allow prevailing plaintiffs to recover prejudgment inter-
1989) (1909 Act), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017 (1990).
229. See Wickham Contracting Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Work-
ers, 955 F.2d 831, 837-38 (2d Cir.) (distinguishing Monessen on the grounds that under
the Labor Management Relations Act "only a relatively small number of courts have
considered directly the issue of prejudgment interest"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 394
(1992); see also Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1032 (1994) (rejecting argu-
ment that case law under the 1909 Act compelled conclusion that Congress endorsed dual
standard for awarding attorneys' fees under the 1976 Act because these cases failed to
establish a clear standard); cf. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 749 (1989) ("Ordinarily, 'Congress' silence is just that-silence."' (quoting Alaska
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987))); Monessen, 486 U.S. at 345 n.3
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("'[T]he doctrine of legislative acquiescence is at best only an
auxiliary tool for use in interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions. . . . We do not
expect Congress to make an affirmative move every time a lower court indulges in an
erroneous interpretation."' (quoting Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 533-34
(1947))).
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est under a different silent statutory scheme, compels a conclusion
to the contrary.
James L. Bernard

